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STEROIDS AND LEGAL ETHICS CODES: ARE
LAWYERS RATIONAL ACTORS?
Fred C. Zacharias*
A TRIBUTE TO FRED ZACHARIASt
During the editing of this Article, on the afternoon of November 11,
2009, Professor Fred Zacharias died at the age of 56.
Professor Zacharias devoted his entire adult lfe to professional responsi-
bility issues, both as an attorney and as a scholar. During the past two
decades, he wrote over sixty leading law review articles in this field. Professor
Zacharias's influence on the development and exploration of legal ethics
issues was immense and multifaceted.
Wholly beyond his academic contributions to the field, as an individ-
ual, Professor Zacharias was a person of consummate integrity. That qual-
ity defined him. Fred not only valued the search for truth and the
improvement of justice, but unerringly sought these ends. Moreover, he did
so not only when these goals were convenient and popular, but even when
they were not.
Fred was his own man. He did not follow trends. He did not vote with
the crowd. He thought deeply and came to his own conclusions. And was
not afraid to voice them.
What follows is the last law review article Professor Zacharias wrote. In
September, Fred came to the conclusion that his battle with cancer would
likely be over by year's end, and that he would accordingly be unable to
complete the editing process of this piece, and asked us if we were willing to
complete his final work. It is a testament to, and typical of Professor
Zacharias that even in the final days of his life, he wanted to complete his
academic work and fulfill what he felt were his obligations to the law review
students who had accepted his piece.
There are few individuals who share the commitment and integrity of
Professor Zacharias. He will be sorely missed.
* Herzog Endowed Research Professor, University of San Diego School of Law.
Many thanks go to Professors Larry Alexander, David McGowan, Frank Partnoy,
Steven D. Smith, and Chris Wonnell for commenting on earlier drafts of this Article
and to Alex Chien and Alexander Guiha for their research assistance.
t This tribute was written by Professors Shaun P. Martin and Frank Partnoy,
colleagues and friends of Professor Zacharias.
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INTRODUCTION
Over time, legal ethics codes have become increasingly specific
and enforceable.' Yet at root, they remain a mixture of hortatory and
concrete mandates, some never enforced, most rarely enforced, and
none universally enforced. 2 Law and economics scholars-and other
observers who internalize a "bad man" theory of human behavior 3-
assume that ethics provisions that do not result in discipline have lit-
tle, or perhaps even counterproductive, effects; 4 hortatory or genera-
lized codes allegedly do not create incentives producing appropriate
lawyer conduct.5
1 See generally Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J.
1239, 1250-51 (1991) (discussing the increasing legalization of ethics codes over
time).
2 See Fred C. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes: Theory, Prac-
tice, and the Paradigm of Prosecutorial Ethics, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 223, 245-46 (1993)
(discussing the effects of code provisions of varying specificity on enforcement).
3 See Tanina Rostain, Ethics Lost: Limitations of Current Approaches to Lawyer Regula-
tion, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 1273, 1282 (1998) (discussing the application of Holmes's "bad
man" analysis to professional ethics).
4 The most explicit discussion of this phenomenon is found in Eli Wald, An
Unlikely Knight in Economic Armor: Law and Economics in Defense of Professional Ideals, 31
SETON HALL L. REV. 1042, 1049-54 (2001) (discussing economists who "simply assume
that professional ideals do not influence the conduct of lawyers"). See also RicHARD A.
POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 189 (1999) (arguing that
the legal profession's "altruistic pretense" may simply reflect an attempt to "conceal
the extent to which its members are motivated by financial incentives"); George
Rutherglen, Lawyer for the Organization: An Essay on Legal Ethics, 1 VA. L. & Bus. REV.
141, 142 (2006) ("Without the prospect of effective sanctions, the rules of ethics are
in danger of being simply ignored under the competitive pressure on the practice of
law today."); cf L. Ray Patterson, The Function of a Code of Legal Ethics, 35 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 695, 725 (1981) ("The ultimate function of a code of legal ethics is the same as
that of any set of ethical rules: it is to keep within reasonable bounds the law of self-
interest that operates at all times and in all places."); Martha Elizabeth Johnston,
Comment, ABA Code of Professional Responsibility: Void for Vagueness?, 57 N.C. L. REV.
671, 671-72 (1979) ("[T]he ABA . .. adopted various disciplinary rules that are writ-
ten in such broad, general terms that they fail to prescribe any intelligible course of
conduct.").
5 See Richard L. Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 TEX. L. REV.
639, 643-44 (1981) ("Rules are less likely to influence behavior the more they man-
date conduct opposed to self-interest and then create loopholes for those intent on
evasion . . . ."). Eli Wald suggests that economists come to this conclusion in part
because they tend to adopt a demand-side perspective of professional rules and ideals,
focusing largely on their effect on clients based on the assumption that lawyers will
follow their clients' wishes. Wald, supra note 4, at 1052; see also RonaldJ. Gilson, The
Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side Perspective, 49 MD. L. REV. 869, 889
672 [VOL. 85:2
STEROIDS AND LEGAL ETHICS CODES
Despite these perspectives, the American Bar Association (ABA)
and state code drafters continue to rely upon mixed rulemaking. One
explanation might be self-interest; by maintaining the illusion of self-
regulation through provisions that sound high-minded, the bar some-
times avoids external regulation that might have bite.6 Another is the
inability of code drafters to achieve consensus on the substance of
rules, resulting in compromised provisions that allow lawyers to
acknowledge ideals but to engage in a range of conduct.7
This Article suggests a third explanation. Although under-
enforced ethics provisions have costs," they can also serve a valuable
function. They address and guide the conduct of a segment of the bar
that does not act entirely upon financial and reputational incentives
in ordering its affairs. Some lawyers, for a variety of reasons, simply
are willing to follow the rules even if doing so may be economically
disadvantageous.
The law and economics response would likely take one of two
forms. First, true economists would suggest that any reason for obey-
ing a rule, including psychic benefits, can be characterized as "eco-
nomic" and therefore fit into the economic analyses of legal ethics
rules.9 Second, some observers assuming a "bad man" vision might
(1990) (asking whether clients will "allow lawyers to be gatekeepers"). Wald argues,
"The reality is more complex because lawyers exercise a significant influence over
clients' demand for their services." Wald, supra note 4, at 1052.
6 Fred C. Zacharias, The Myth of Self-Regulation, 93 MINN. L. REv. 1147, 1150-52
(2009) (discussing code drafters' often misplaced desire to preempt external
regulation).
7 See Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Permissive Rules of Professional Conduct,
91 MINN. L. REv. 265, 313 (2006) (discussing compromise provisions).
8 See Fred C. Zacharias, What Lawyers Do When Nobody's Watching: Legal Advertis-
ing as a Case Study of the Impact of Underenforced Professional Rules, 87 IowA L. REV. 971,
1005-09 (2002) (identifying and analyzing the costs of underenforced rules).
9 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law,
50 STAN. L. REv. 1551, 1552 (1998) (noting that law and economics "long ago aban-
doned the model of hyperrational, emotionless, unsocial, supremely egoistic, non-
strategic man (or woman) that [some behavioral economists sometimes] ascribe to it"
(footnote omitted)); id. at 1554 (explaining why so-called "irrational behavior" does
not undermine rationality analysis); cf Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics'Per-
fect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics'Equal Incompetence,
91 GEo. L.J. 67, 81 (2002) ("[W]hen the legal decision theorists say that some legally
relevant behavior is supposedly 'nonrational,' 'quasi-rational,' or 'irrational,' they sim-
ply mean that a legal actor failed to apply the proper rules or norms for arriving at a
judgment or decision, not that the action taken has an irrational purpose or unwise
goal."). As Jeffrey Harrison has suggested, when the rational actor approach is
expanded to include psychic costs and benefits, it tends to become tautological or to
lose its explanatory value. Jeffrey L. Harrison, Piercing Pareto Superiority: Real People and
the Obligations of Legal Theory, 39 ARIz. L. REV. 1, 2 (1997); see also Christine Jolls et al.,
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simply deny that people (including lawyers) ever act, or should act, on
non-financial or non-quantifiably economic incentives.10
This Article calls these perspectives into question by drawing
from the recent history of steroid use in baseball a series of character
traits that prompted baseball players to use or avoid performing-
enhancing drugs." One can be fairly confident that a range of atti-
tudes toward rules forbidding steroid use has existed, causing some
players to employ steroids, others to dabble, and yet others to relig-
iously avoid them.12 This Article suggests that the bar consists of law-
yers with the same range of approaches to legal ethics rules. If that is
correct, hortatory rules cannot fairly be criticized for failing to sanc-
A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1488-89 (1998)
("[T]he term 'rationality' is highly ambiguous and can be used to mean many
things.... [Sbo high a degree of flexibility leaves the theory with few a priori restric-
tions."); Tanina Rostain, Educating Homo Economicus: Cautionary Notes on the New
Behavioral Law and Economics Movement, 34 LAW & Soc'v REV. 973, 977 (2000) ("When
the content of a rational actor's preferences is left open, however, the theory is too
indeterminate to yield many empirically falsifiable predictions.").
10 See Philip Pettit, Virtus Normativa: Rational Choice Perspectives, 100 ETHIcs 725,
726-27 (1990) ("It will be in [people's] economic interest ... if the direct self-inter-
ested benefit of honoring the norms, in particular the sort of benefit that can be
assigned monetary value, exceeds the cost; it will be in their social interest if honoring
the norms promotes the esteem, affection, or pleasure with which they are viewed and
this indirect self-interested benefit exceeds the cost. . . . No choice of a kind they
commonly make is likely to undermine both their economic and social prospects.");
cf Stephen McG. Bundy & Einer Elhauge, Knowledge About Legal Sanctions, 92 MICH. L.
REv. 261, 274-75 (1993) (noting the limitations of "rational actor accounts" that
employ a baseline assumption that "actors are sanction optimizers"); id. ("[Holmesian
"bad men" consider] only the actual level of expected legal sanctions and give[ ] no
independent weight to the fact that the conduct is legally prohibited or required"
(footnote omitted)).
11 To be clear: this Article does not suggest that perfect law and economics mod-
eling would fail to account for the behavioral considerations the Article emphasizes.
The instinct to follow the law, for example, while not a conscious choice made by a
rational actor, still can fit into economic models if it is deemed to reflect the actor's
implicit preference for engaging in law-abiding behavior. This Article merely suggests
that behavioral considerations often are given short shrift in the application of eco-
nomic models and that these can explain and justify some ethics rules that rational-
actor theorists criticize. Cf Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to
Rational Actors: A Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23, 23
(1989) ("[Plractitioners [of law and economics] should increasingly look to psychol-
ogy and sociology in order to enrich the explanatory power and normative punch of
economic analysis"); id. at 25 ("The trade-off between theoretical simplicity and pre-
dictive power is a difficult one.").
12 To avoid falsely accusing players who have come under the shadow of the ster-
oid scandals, this Article avoids pointing fingers at individual players unless they have
openly admitted steroid use or been clearly shown to have transgressed.
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tion "bad man" lawyers, because those lawyers may not be the targets
of the rules.13 Ethics code drafting, however, can be faulted for failing
to adequately identify the categories of lawyers that particular rules
are designed to influence.
Three caveats should be noted at the outset. First, this Article
focuses on ethics regulation that addresses conduct in which lawyers
must accommodate their own interests or client demands against
potentially contrary interests of clients, courts, specified third parties,
or society as a whole. The codes include provisions that serve a host of
secondary functions, including facilitating communications among
lawyers and the courts,14 setting defeasible default rules that lawyers
and clients can contract around, 15 reducing agency costs, 16 and
enhancing efficiency in the legal system.17 Market forces (including
the desire for reciprocal cooperation) and judicial enforcement of
13 George Cohen has suggested broadly, and perhaps correctly as a descriptive
matter, that law and economics theory and traditional assumptions underlying the
professionalism movement have been inconsistent. George M. Cohen, When Law and
Economics Met Professional Responsibility, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 273, 275 (1998) ("[A]t
first blush, the two fields take diametrically opposed positions on the topic [of self-
interest]."); see also Gilson, supra note 5, at 871 ("Both views-economists' indiffer-
ence to the lawyers' public oriented vision of professionalism and the disdain students
of the legal profession often display for economic analysis-are incomplete . . . .").
While law and economics focuses on reconciling regulation with actors' self-interested
behavior, Cohen notes that the "working assumption" of professional theory "has
often been that ethics or professionalism requires lawyers to resist self-interest, and
the relevant question has been thought to be simply what the nature of this resis-
tance-that is, the content of ethical behavior-should be." Cohen, supra, at 275.
Cohen recognizes, however, that ethics rules sometimes take self-interested behavior
into account and that neither law and economics nor professional responsibility the-
ory is "as wedded to [its] basic assumptions as it purports to be." Id. This Article
attempts to explain and justify that apparent dichotomy.
14 See Zacharias, supra note 2, at 266 (discussing communication facilitation and
other functions of legal ethics codes).
15 See Richard A. Epstein, The Legal Regulation of Lawyers' Conflicts of Interests, 60
FoRDHAM L. REV. 579, 590-91 (1992) (analyzing conflict of interest rules as default
rules necessary because contracts between lawyers and clients "are often incomplete,
and do not specify the exact consequences that flow if and when a conflict of interest
emerges"); Richard W. Painter, Rules Lawyers Play By, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 665, 674-92
(2001) (discussing professional responsibility rules that contemplate contracting
between lawyers and clients); Fred C. Zacharias, Integrity Ethics, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETH-
ics 541, 586-87 (2009) (analyzing when ethics rules should be treated as defeasible).
16 See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical Rules, Agency Costs, and Law Firm Structure, 84
VA. L. REv. 1707, 1708 (1998) ("An important, though not the only, function of ethi-
cal rules is reducing agency costs between lawyers and clients.").
17 SeeJonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, An Economic Analysis of Conflict of
Interest Regulation, 82 IowA L. REv. 965, 966 (1997) (noting the code-drafting goal of
"adopting economically efficient [ethics] rules that reduce costs").
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these rules increase lawyers' willingness to adhere to them. Such rules
are not this Article's primary concern; it addresses those provisions
that law and economics critics intuitively might consider ineffective-
generalized, hortatory, or underenforced standards that typically
relate to morality or professionalism concerns.
Second, this Article does not address the moral questions of
whether and when lawyers might be justified in violating professional
rules.' 8 This Article considers the separate, more practical question of
whether professional rulemakers can reasonably expect hortatory or
unenforced regulation to influence the bar.' 9
Finally, this Article does not claim to describe the actual inten-
tions of ABA or state code drafters or to justify particular professional
rules.20 It simply addresses the general criticism that underenforced
rules are universally ineffective. When code drafters feasibly can, or
should, employ such rules is a question that this Article leaves for
another day.
I. THE LESSONS OF THE STEROID ERA
Classic law and economics analysis considers the incentives pro-
duced by regulation of unwanted behavior. If a law or rule outlaws
particular conduct, but there is a benefit to be achieved by engaging
in the conduct, the rule's effectiveness will depend on the likelihood
of being caught, the sanctions, and the actor's risk-averseness. 2' The
18 There is substantial philosophical literature addressing the rationality of fol-
lowing generally sound legal rules when, in an individual case, a person governed by
the rules perceives that disobedience would be personally or socially beneficial. See
e.g., LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES 54 (2001); Edward F.
McClennen, The Rationality of Being Guided by Rules, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
RATIONALITY 222, 222-35 (Alfred R. Mele & Piers Rawling eds., 2004); ScottJ. Sha-
piro, The Difference that Rules Make, in ANALYZING LAw 33, 33-62 (Brian Bix ed., 1998).
19 Stated more generally, it asks how a rule is likely to operate collectively when
some targets will be guided by the rule, others will not, and yet others may be affected
by the manner in which people in the first two groups act.
20 Thus, this Article neither lays claim to know whether the code drafters adopted
the rules discussed below based on the rationales the Article suggests nor entertains
the issue of whether the rules represent a manifestation of the bar's self-interest.
21 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMic ANALYSIS OF LAW § 7.1, at 218 (7th ed.
2007) (arguing that, to provide effective deterrence, the damages must equal the
harm caused by the act divided by the probability of actually being caught and forced
to pay); Jeff T. Casey & John T. Scholz, Beyond Deterrence: Behavioral Decision Theory and
Tax Compliance, 25 LAw & Soc'v REv. 821, 823 (1991) ("In the simplest compliance
model, compliance is treated as the status quo, and the [potential lawbreaker] com-
pares the advantage of noncompliance if not detected . . . with the disadvantage if
detected ... after discounting each by its probability."); Steven Shavell, Criminal Law
and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1232,
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rational actor will continue to engage in the conduct despite the pro-
hibition if the rule is not enforced or weakly enforced, the benefits of
violating the rule (on average) exceed the likely sanctions, and there
are no other costs associated with violations.22
The key to this risk-rewards analysis is the notion that "no other
costs" associated with violating the law or rule exist. Law and econom-
ics freely acknowledges the existence of real non-financial costs,
assuming that these must be factored into any balance. 23 The costs
may include culturally produced byproducts of regulated conduct,
including reputational effects and personal psychological impacts of
violating a law or being caught. When the other costs are sufficiently
high, a rational actor may forebear from violating a law or rule even if
he is likely to get away with the violation or the tangible benefits asso-
ciated with the violation far exceed the probable sanction.
Consider the history of performance-enhancing drugs in base-
ball. At least for drugs that could not be procured without a lawful
prescription, steroid use was always impermissible.2 4 At some point,
baseball instituted a formal policy forbidding steroid use, but did not
enforce it.25 Then, limited drug testing was instituted, somewhat
1235 (1985) (describing the theoretical balancing conducted by potential
lawbreakers).
22 See POSNER, supra note 21, § 7.2, at 219 ("A person commits a crime because
the expected benefits exceed the expected costs."); Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punish-
ment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 176-77 (1968) (stating that people
will commit crimes if their expected utility, including probability of and severity of
punishment, exceeds the expected utility of alternate activities); Casey & Scholz, supra
note 21, at 821 ("Especially since the development of expected utility (EU) theory by
von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), [law] compliance has been analyzed using
models of decisionmaking under risk and uncertainty in which the EU of the poten-
tial gains is balanced against the potential legal, social, and internalized personal
sanctions from participating in illegal behavior . . . ."); cf Ronald L. Akers, Rational
Choice, Deterrence, and Social Learning Theory in Criminology: The Path Not Taken, 81 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 653, 655 (1990) (positing that "the primary concepts and
valid postulates of deterrence and rational choice [theories] are subsumable under
general social learning or behavioral principles").
23 See, e.g., JEFFREY L. HARRISON, LAw AND ECONOMICS IN A NUTSHELL 64-65 (4th
ed. 2007) (discussing how the framing of sanctions can affect peoples' "tastes," which
in turn must be taken into account when evaluating preferences); Mark P. Gergen,
The Logic OfDeterrence: Corporate Tax Shelters, 55 TAx L. REv. 255, 262 (2002) (modeling
tax law compliance so as to include the factors of reputational concerns and "distaste
for tangling with the government").
24 See, e.g., Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 503(b), 21 U.S.C. § 353(b)
(2006) (forbidding use of all prescription drugs except when their use is determined
to be proper and is supervised by a licensed medical practitioner).
25 Anabolic steroids have been expressly listed among baseball's prohibited sub-
stances since 1991, but the Major League Baseball Players Association (the "Players
2010] 677
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increasing the risk of apprehension, but not significantly.26 Eventu-
ally, penalties increased and became mandatory, and more stringent
testing procedures were implemented. 27
At each stage, in theory, rational-actor baseball players had to
make a choice: employ steroids and risk sanction or forgo the per-
formance-enhancing benefits. As the penalties grew, the imposition
of sanctions became regularized, and as the likelihood of apprehen-
sion through testing increased, the incentives to demur increased as
well. Throughout the period, however, some rational players deter-
mined that the benefits of taking steroids warranted the risks.
For ease of analysis, one can categorize the players into five
groups.28 The categories are summarized for reference purposes in
Table 1, but are described more fully below.
Association") did not agree to this policy, thus retaining the ability to challenge deci-
sions by the Commissioner to impose discipline for violations of the policy. GEORGEJ.
MITCHELL, REPORT TO THE COMMISSIONER OF BASEBALL OF AN INDEPENDENT INVESTIGA-
TION INTO THE ILLEGAL USE OF STEROIDS AND OTHER PERFORMANCE ENHANCING SuB-
STANCES BY PLAYERS IN MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL 25 (2007).
26 In 2002, Major League Baseball and the Players Association agreed on a joint
drug program that led to survey testing and the possibility of mandatory random test-
ing, but which did not provide for automatic discipline of first-time offenders. Id. at
50-55.
27 The union-approved drug program was strengthened in 2005. The new policy
added human growth hormones and performance-enhancing "compounds" to the
banned substances list and led to automatic punishments of fifty-game suspensions for
first-time offenders, one-hundred-game suspensions for second-time offenders, and a
permanent ban for third-time offenders. Id. at 57-58.
28 Different categorizations are possible. One could, for example, treat the first
two categories-the "cheaters" and "complementary rational actors" who decide the
costs outweigh the benefits-as "pure rational actors." One could also treat the third
category, which emphasizes more esoteric or long-term costs and benefits, as pure
rational actors as well. The categorizations above are neither more nor less accurate;
they are useful simply as a means of labeling and separating the groups.
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TABLE 1. CATEGORY PROCLIVITY
1. Cheater Classic "bad man"
Rational, but is prone to fearing the
2. Complementary Rational Actor costs or being dubious about the
benefits of outlawed behavior
Considers the full range of costs,
3. Nuanced Rational Actor especially reputational effects of
outlawed behavior
Rational Actor Values behaving properly and in law-
4. Clean Rabiding fashion
5. Socialized Person Follows rules, largely unquestioningly
First, there are the players who took performance-enhancing
drugs. These are the "rational actor cheaters" or "bad men," such as
Jos6 Canseco,29 Jason Giambi,s0 and probably Barry Bonds.31 They
simply measured the rewards of taking steroids-including improved
performance and the resulting contractual and marketing benefits-
against the likely costs, choosing to pursue the benefits. Some may
have even taken pleasure, psychologically, in adopting a "win-at-all
cost" approach, believing that this one-track mindset made them
29 In an interview with 60 Minutes prior to the release of his tell-all book juiced,
Jos6 Canseco admitted to using steroids and human growth hormones for his entire
career. He stated that he would never have been a Major League-caliber player with-
out steroids and that he was willing to try everything possible to become the best
player in the world. David Hancock, Steroid-User Canseco Names Names, CBS NEWS, Feb.
13, 2005, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/02/10/60minutes/main673138.
shtml.
30 Giambi admitted to Senator George Mitchell that he began using anabolic ster-
oids in 2001 and that in December 2002 or January 2003 he began following a pro-
gram of performance enhancement which included human growth hormones and
designer substances such as the "cream" and the "clear." MITCHELL, supra note 25, at
130-33.
31 Based on the overwhelming evidence, it appears that Bonds used banned sub-
stances, but that has yet to be proven in court. See generally MARK FAINARU-WADA &
LANCE WILLIAms, GAME OF SHADOWS 142-44 (2006) (reporting the suspicious circum-
stances surrounding Bonds's denials of steroid use). According to one telling conver-
sation that occurred around the time that Bonds allegedly started his steroid use,
Bonds was influenced by the success of other "cheaters." He reportedly stated:
As much as I've complained about McGwire and Canseco and all of the bull
with steroids, I'm tired of fighting it. I turn 35 this year. I've got three or
four good seasons left, and I wanna get paid. I'm just gonna start using
some hard-core stuff, and hopefully it won't hurt my body. Then I'll get out
of the game and be done with it.
Jeff Pearlman, For Bonds, Great Wasn't Good Enough, ESPN MAG., Mar. 27, 2006, availa-
ble at http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=2368395 (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Bonds).
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attractive in the mold of aggressive winners such as Vince Lombardi,32
Leo Durocher,33 and Pete Rose.3 4
Ken Caminiti, the first player to publicly admit using steroids, is a
good example. Up to his death, Caminiti defended his decision to
rely on performance-enhancing drugs. "If a young player were to ask
me what to do," Caminiti said, "I'm not going to tell him it's bad.
Look at all the money in the game: You have a chance to set your
family up, to get your daughter into a better school."3 5 Caminiti con-
tinued with a view to the competition: "[I] can't say, 'Don't do it,' not
when the guy next to you is as big as a house and he's going to take
your job and make the money."3 6
The next two categories of players fit the rational-actor mold as
well. For our purposes, these players can be considered intermediate
rational actors. They engaged in the same type of calculations as the
cheaters or bad men but reached different conclusions-either
because they assessed the costs differently or considered a wider range
of costs.
One might call the first intermediate group "complementary
rational actors," because these players were the flip side of the cheat-
ers. They evaluated the potential sanctions and risks of testing posi-
tively (or being caught in other ways) and concluded that the cost of
taking steroids, including the health dangers, outweighed the bene-
fits. The category of complementary rational actors may simply have
been more risk-averse than the so-called bad men.3 7 Alternatively,
something about the specific situations of the players in this category
32 In Lombardi's words, "Winning isn't everything, it's the only thing." VINCE
LOMBARDI, WHAT IT TAKEs To BE #1, at 271 (2003).
33 Durocher, known as an ultracompetitive player and manager, is most famous
for saying, "Nice guys finish last." But he also said, "How you play the game is for
college boys. When you're playing for money, winning is the only thing that matters."
LEO DUROCHER & ED LINN, NICE Guys FINISH LAST 11, 14 (1975).
34 Pete Rose-baseball's "Mr. Hustle"-was known for doing everything possible
to win. In his own words, he would "'walk through hell in a gasoline suit to keep
playing baseball.'" Mike Wise, Charlie Hustle is Hustling, Quietly, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30,
2003, at SP7 (quoting Rose).
35 Tom Verducci, Totally Juiced, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, June 3, 2002, at 36 (report-
ing interview with Ken Caminiti).
36 Id. (quoting Ken Caminiti).
37 Cf BEHAVIORAL LAw & EcoNOMics 5-6 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000) (discussing
the significance of "loss aversion" in actors' calculations); Daniel Kahneman & Amos
Tversky, Conflict Resolution: A Cognitive Perspective, in BARRIERS TO CONFLIcr RESOLU-
TION 44, 54 (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 1995) (positing that people emphasize
potential losses over potential gains); Paul Slovic et al., Regulation of Risk: A Psychologi-
cal Perspective, in REGULATORY POLIcy & THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 241, 248-56 (Roger G.
Noll ed., 1985) (discussing reasons for variations in people's evaluations of risk).
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may have affected their calculations. A player who did not have easy
access to steroids, for example, would have faced a greater risk of
being apprehended when seeking a source than would a player who
was already in contact with a supplier or other knowledgeable pro-
curement agent."" Other players, such as Greg Maddux, may have
believed their playing or workout styles did not lend themselves to
significant improvement through the use of steroids.3 9
Some baseball players who avoided performance-enhancing
drugs probably engaged in a more complex risk-reward calculation
than the athletes in the first two categories. The "nuanced rational
actors" in this third category focused on the potential adverse effects
of steroid use on their images and long-term earning power, empha-
sizing the reputational impact of being caught or being rumored to be
a user. One might expect the nuanced rational actor category to have
included players who already played at a high level of competence
and had to assess whether marginally improved performance would
improve their marketability. 40 It also may have included some margi-
nal but secure players who had to consider whether a hint of impro-
priety would cost them their jobs.41 As testing and publicity about
steroid use became more prominent, nuanced rational actors would
have become increasingly hesitant to continue any use of banned
substances.
The fourth category of players consisted of what can best be
termed "clean rational actors." Although proving the negative is
impossible, we know intuitively that many baseball players avoided
38 Thus, for example, players on the New York Mets may have downplayed the
risk of apprehension because a clubhouse attendant provided easy access to perform-
ance-enhancing drugs. See MITCHELL, supra note 25, at 141-44 (describing the activi-
ties of Kirk Radomski); cf id. at 152-158 (describing the process by which Larry
Bigbie learned about steroids and found a supplier).
39 Maddux, who used finesse and strategy to pitch his way into eight All-Star
games, is perhaps the quintessential example of a player whose style of play did not
lend itself to significant improvement by steroid use. See generally George F. Will, The
Artistry of Mr. Maddux, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 25, 2005, at 84 (describing Maddux's pitching
style).
40 Clean-cut Yankee captain Derek Jeter, who has consistently denied any use of
steroids, may arguably fit this category. Considered by business experts to be base-
ball's most marketable player, Jeter derives great financial benefit from not only his
level of play but also his clean image. See David Sweet, Jeter, A-Rod Baseball's Most
Marketable, MSNBC.com, Mar. 27, 2008, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/2380297; see
also Mark Feinsand, Rodriguez Could Take Hit on Any Ad Deals, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Feb. 9,
2009, at 5 (describing potential damage to Alex Rodriguez's marketing revenue from
revelation of his steroid usage).
41 Players on the bubble of making their clubs, in contrast, would need to weigh
whether steroid use would help or hurt them more in the quest for a roster position.
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performance-enhancing drugs for reasons that were not economic in
the ordinary sense of that term. They did not act out of fear of sanc-
tions or a calculation of the potential effects of drug use on their rep-
utations for marketing purposes, but rather placed a great
psychological value on being perceived as drug-free. The clean
rational actors may have derived a personal sense of moral superiority
at succeeding in baseball without the benefit of performance-enhanc-
ing drugs. 4 2 Tony Gwynn, for example, explained his decision to
forgo performance-enhancing drugs in this way: "The thrill of the
game for me was being able to go out and perform at a higher level
than other people. That was my drug."43 Other players, including
Ken Griffey, Jr., wished to inspire other players with their moral recti-
tude or desired the appreciation of peers, friends, and the media for
their rule-abiding behavior.44
Although not significant in analyzing the baseball context, it is
important to note that the clean rational actor can represent two
kinds of people. The first is influenced by the legal norms prescribing
correct behavior. Thus, a baseball player might have chosen to avoid
steroids precisely because the rules so instructed him; the rules set the
terms of the game which the player honored. The second kind of
clean rational actor, in contrast, is largely unaffected by rules, follow-
ing his own moral code and abiding by the prescribed norms only
when they are consistent with his personal code.45 As will be discussed
42 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 903,
945 (1996) (arguing that people often act in a way that supports a self conception of
themselves as contributing to the perceived social good).
43 Tony Gwynn, Steroids Taint Caminiti's Career, ESPN.com, May 29, 2002, http://
static.espn.go.com/mlb/columns/gwynn-tony/1388401.html (reflecting on Ken
Caminiti's admissions of steroid use).
44 Griffey explained his rationale as follows:
If I can't do it myself, then I'm not going to do it ..... When I'm retired, I
want them to at least be able to say, "There's no question in our minds that
he did it the right way." I have kids. I don't want them to think their dad's a
cheater.
Pearlman, supra note 31 (quoting Ken Griffey, Jr.) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted); cf Ellickson, supra note 11, at 43 ("The reality of pervasive third-party social con-
trols is not inconsistent with the standard economic model because an other-
regarding egoist would give weight to acclaim, ostracism, and other forms of social
sanctions."); Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175, 1186
(1997) (arguing that rational actors may nonetheless sacrifice their self interest in
order to appear fair to members of their communities).
45 See ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 18, at 54 (arguing that even a good rule
"inevitably will dictate erroneous results in some of the cases it covers, and it is neither
rational nor morally correct for individuals to follow the rule when they believe that
STEROIDS AND LEGAL ETHICS CODES
in Part II of this Article,4 6 in non-sports contexts that present inherent
moral issues, this type of actor may present the same problem for
rulemakers as bad men because his conduct also is determined by
non-rule factors.47
The final category of baseball player probably did no cost-benefit
analysis at all.48 He was a well-socialized person who assumed, con-
sciously or intuitively, that laws or rules should be followed whether or
not enforced.4 9 In the words of career minor-leaguer Shawn Garrett:
"There's right and there's wrong. Those guys [who use steroids] have
to look themselves in the mirror."5 0 This type of player simply imple-
mented a core, arguably religious, belief in obedience to the rules-in
playing baseball the right way and adhering to the established order.5 1
its prescription is wrong for the circumstances in which they find themselves" (foot-
note omitted)).
46 See infra text accompanying note 65.
47 Where a rule addresses behavior that is morally debatable, this actor may-like
the cheater-violate the rule. The only difference is that he departs from society's
requirements for moral rather than selfish reasons.
48 See Milton C. Regan, Jr., Moral Intuitions and Organizational Culture, 51 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 941, 943 (2007) (discussing the "notion that conscious deliberation typi-
cally plays but a minor role in shaping behavior"). For a philosophical analysis of
whether it is rational for an actor to act on a prior commitment to pursue particular
conduct (e.g., a legal requirement) even though the action at the time may be
counter to the actor's benefit, see David Gauthier, Rethinking the Toxin Puzzle, in
RATIONAL COMMITMENT AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 47, 49-53 (Jules L. Coleman & Christo-
pher W. Morris eds., 1998), and McClennen, supra note 18, at 224-26.
49 See Alan H. Goldman, The Rationality of Complying with Rules: Paradox Resolved,
116 ETHICS 453, 457-59 (2006) (discussing a range of reasons other than the poten-
tial for sanctions why a person might rationally comply with a rule); cf FREDRICK
SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES 145-46 (1991) ("[W]hen a decision-maker decides
according to the rules and therefore relies on decisions made by others, she is par-
tially freed from the responsibility of scrutinizing every substantively relevant feature
of the event."); Shapiro, supra note 18, at 36 (noting that sometimes a rational actor
may be guided by a rule "because it affects his beliefs about his preferences despite
the fact that . . . he actually prefers not to conform to the rule").
50 Rick Reilly, A Lot of Guys in the Minors Got Hosed by Steroids. They Should Sue,
ESPN.com, Sept. 8, 2008, http://sports.espn.go.com/espnmag/story?id=3565273.
51 Former player Chad Curtis, for example, has said:
There are two things that might stop a person from using steroids: a moral
obligation-they're illegal-and a fear of the medical complications. I was
100 percent against the use of steroids. But I must tell you, I would not fear
the medical side of it. I fully agree you can take them safely.
Verducci, supra 35, at 48 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Curtis). As
discussed supra note 9, law and economics theorists would argue that these players
engaged in an implicit cost-benefit analysis in which they placed great weight on their
preferences for law-abiding behavior. However the phenomenon is characterized,
there seems little doubt that some actors are affected by "social norms and moral
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Looking from the outside, it is difficult to distinguish among the
nuanced rational actor baseball players, the clean rational actors, and
the socialized athletes. Players who came out of the steroids period
with pure reputations-the Tony Gwynns and Ken Griffey Juniors of
the world-may have done so in order to preserve their image for
economic reasons, to encourage adulation, or simply because they
were following their own code of proper behavior.
Cynical observers might also doubt that any variance in behavior
actually occurred. Just because some players denied steroid use does
not necessarily mean they practiced as they preached; a classic bad
man would have used performance-enhancing drugs and then denied
it.52 Arguably, therefore, the number of nuanced, clean, or socialized
actors might in fact have been small and the effect of outlawing ster-
oids minimal. Nevertheless, most observers' intuition is that there was
a broad spectrum of conduct and that, although substance abuse was
prevalent, many players followed the rules. This Article proceeds on
that assumption.
In order to assess the effects of changes in baseball's policies and
regulations on the players, it is important to consider the players
within their categories, because the effects of regulation will have
varied. Initially, when steroids were banned (i.e., unlawful) but no
testing was done and the likelihood of being caught was small, the
cheaters, complementary rational actors, and nuanced rational actors
all had strong temptations to violate the ban; the benefits of violation
were substantial and the incentives for compliance relatively small.5 3
Clean rational actors who independently had a distaste for perform-
ance-enhancing drugs or who valued the psychological benefits of rec-
titude would have avoided steroids. For socialized players, there was
no choice.
In the ensuing period, penalties increased but the absence of
meaningful testing meant that the likelihood of avoiding apprehen-
sion remained strong. The changes in the regulatory sanction scheme
commitment to following the law." Note, Rule Porousness and the Design of Legal Direc-
tives, 121 HARv. L. REV. 2134, 2135 (2008) (footnote omitted); see also Sunstein, supra
note 42, at 906, 958-59 ("[T]here is a general norm in favor of obeying the law.").
52 As, for example, appears to have been the case with Roger Clemens and Barry
Bonds. MITCHELL, supra note 25, at 128.
53 There is a serious question about the significance of health concerns in play-
ers' minds arising from the use of performance-enhancing drugs. Information con-
cerning the risks tended to be inconsistent and, because steroids often were obtained
from persons other than doctors, was not always conveyed to, or brought to the atten-
tion of, the potential users. Cf Casey & Scholz, supra note 21, at 840-41 (describing
studies suggesting that potential lawbreakers' "decisions are sensitive to how risk
information is presented").
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and the publicizing of criminal investigations into steroid use by ath-
letes may have influenced the more risk averse among the comple-
mentary rational actors, but many cheaters and nuanced rational
actors stayed the course. The insubstantiality of the risk of disclosure
meant that the benefits still outweighed the costs.
Only after mandatory penalties and a relatively rigorous testing
regime were approved by the players' union did the balance shift.
Then, even bad men players-the committed cheaters-necessarily
developed reduced expectations of obtaining benefits that justified
suspension or loss of employment costs. The changes in regulation
clearly impacted the complementary and nuanced rational actors,
who, by definition, adjust their behavior according to the prevailing
costs and benefits. The clean rational actors and socialized players
would have continued to be unaffected by the regulatory
amendments.
In a law and economics sense, all five categories represent
rational decisionmaking. Even the socialized player can be character-
ized as one who values his moral code (i.e., following the law) so
highly that the benefits of complying with regulation outweigh the
costs. But the psychological benefits emphasized by the clean rational
actors and socialized players are inputs that are more difficult to quan-
tify and prove than the level of sanctions, the likelihood of enforce-
ment, and the financial benefits of noncompliance. It is also harder
to predict when such inputs will take priority in an actor's economic
evaluation, because the inputs appear to be inflexible but at some
point might be overcome if most other competitors break the rules.5 4
For practical reasons, therefore, the psychological considerations
often are assumed away, or left out, in the application of traditional
law and economic models of rule compliance.55
54 This phenomenon is discussed infra text accompanying note 149.
55 SeeJolls et al., supra note 9, at 1473 ("The absence of sustained and compre-
hensive economic analysis of legal rules from a perspective informed by insights about
actual human behavior makes for a significant contrast with many other fields of eco-
nomics, where such 'behavioral' analysis has become relatively common."); Donald C.
Langevoort, Behavioral Theories ofJudgment and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A
Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REv. 1499, 1500 (1998) ("[B]oth psychology and sociol-
ogy have suffered from the inability to generate a unified behavioral model rivaling
the simplicity, elegance, and testability of the economist's utility-maximizing rational
actor."); see also Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforce-
ment Strategy, 2 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 53, 70 (1986) (noting that gatekeepers, including
lawyers, would be willing to be corrupted by their clients "if [they] had no scruples,"
but largely omitting the effect of scruples from the subsequent analysis); cf Robert
Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1523, 1527 (1984) (assuming away
non-self-interested behavior for purposes of the author's economic analysis).
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II. BASEBALL AND LEGAL ETHICS CODES
The baseball context is not unique. One can point to examples
throughout society in which informal influences beyond legal sanc-
tions drive personal conduct, including the desire for self-esteem,
reputational effects, and a sense of honor. Classic economic theory
might predict that college students would never follow unenforced or
loosely enforced honor codes, but that does not seem to be the case;
cheating may be prevalent, but many students nevertheless obey the
rules. Likewise, economic analysis might suggest that customers of
restaurants, taxis, and other services would never tip the service-pro-
vider unless they are likely to be repeat customers5 6 and that taxpayers
would uniformly violate unenforced tax provisions;57 again, that does
not appear to be what happens. As a behavioral matter, people do not
always act as classic bad men.58
In an article based on a fascinating set of empirical studies, Nina
Mazar, On Amir, and Dan Ariely suggest that people's ability to ration-
alize dishonest or unlawful conduct as honest, and their unconscious
inattention to moral and legal standards, help explain the variations
in behavior.59 This explanation has some force in the baseball con-
text, in which players may have justified steroid use to themselves on
the basis of such considerations as "everyone does it" and "fans and
the powers-that-be want us to violate the rules in order to hit more
home runs." To the extent players followed the lead of steroid-users
or trainers in the clubhouse, they also may have taken the substances
unthinkingly, or without fully considering the moral or regulatory
standards governing the behavior (including the fact that obtaining
steroids violated the law). Although the Mazir-Amir-Ariely analysis is
potentially relevant to the subject at hand, this Article limits itself to
the more general issue of whether it makes sense to treat lawyers uni-
formly as economically rational actors.60
56 Arguably, tipping may be an example of serving the collective self-interest in
encouraging good service. See infra note 90 (discussing the notion that rational actors
sometimes will set aside immediate personal self-interest on the benefit that they will
benefit in the long term from collective compliance with a social norm).
57 See Goldman, supra note 49, at 453-54 (discussing the rationality of taxpaying).
58 Rostain, supra note 9, at 1001-02 ("Experimental research . . . seems to suggest
that most people are not either fundamentally self-interested or altruistic, but,
instead, have a mix of motivations, which different situations can elicit.").
59 Nina Mazar et al., The Dishonesty of Honest People: A Theory of Self-Concept Mainte-
nance, 45 J. MARKETING REs. 633, 633-35 (2008).
60 One could, again, incorporate the Mazar-Amir-Ariely approach into rational
choice theory simply by treating individuals' self-concept, and the effect of conduct
on that self-concept, as a cost of particular courses of action. See supra text accompa-
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Not surprisingly, in a bar consisting of a variety of human
beings,61 lawyers have the same diversity in attitudes toward profes-
sional regulation as baseball players.62 For some attorneys, the rules
do not matter. They will always do what is in their personal best inter-
est, taking into account the potential costs of violating the governing
codes. Two separate sets of attorneys are likely to be more obedient.
Some (socialized) lawyers simply have a taste for following the rules,
even when the mandates are inconsistent with selfish interests. One
psychological study suggests that lawyers' moral reasoning generally
tends to be formed with reference to laws, rules, and the goal of main-
taining social order.63 Other lawyers follow the rules because the
rules inform their view of appropriate behavior or because their own
moral codes coincide with the rules. These "clean rational actors"
may obey the codes despite their economic self-interest and would act
similarly even in the absence of any rules.64
The key group, for purposes of professional code drafting, are
the lawyers who lie somewhere in between-the groups that, in the
baseball context, this Article has termed "complementary" and
"nuanced" rational actors. These actors are susceptible to accultura-
tion by regulation and influence by the extreme groups. One might
nying notes 9, 54. That perspective, however, may downplay the external factors that
law and economics analysts prefer to emphasize. Mazar, Amir, and Ariely seem to
treat their self-concept theory as a form of behavioral analysis separate from rational
choice. See Mazar et al., supra note 59, at 633-35.
61 See generally Fred C. Zacharias, The Humanization of Lawyers, 2002 PROF. LAW.
SYMP. ISSUEs 9, 10 (discussing the historical tendency of the bar and society to act as if
attorneys are different than other citizens).
62 The few empirical studies suggest that lawyers do not respond to professional
rules in uniform fashion. See generally Susan Daicoff, (Oxymoron?) Ethical Decisionmak-
ing by Attorneys: An Empirical Study, 48 FLA. L. REV. 197, 202-21 (1996) (analyzing ethi-
cal decisionmaking by attorneys); Lisa G. Lerman, Lying to Clients, 138 U. PA. L. REv.
659, 661-62 (1990) (discussing lawyer implementation of rules prohibiting misrepre-
sentation to and full communication with clients); Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confi-
dentiality, 74 IOWA L. REv. 351, 382-96 (1989) (analyzing lawyer responses to the
confidentiality rule and exceptions).
63 See Lawrence J. Landwehr, Lawyers as Social Progressives or Reactionaries: the Law
and Order Cognitive Orientation of Lawyers, 7 LAW & PSYCHOL. REv. 39, 48-50 (1982)
(finding that lawyers conform to Kohlberg's "Stage 4" reasoning). But cf Daicoff,
supra note 62, at 201 (discussing a study finding that "attorneys did not rely on laws,
rules, and regulations as the reasons for their decisions more often than they relied
on other rationales").
64 See Harrison, supra note 9, at 2 (suggesting that the assumption of persons
acting on rational self-interest sometimes breaks down because there are "context[s]
in which norms and principles push people to do things that seem to make no sense if
self-interest is the only goal").
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view them as sheep potentially following either herd.65 They will fol-
low the rules when failing to do so will adversely affect their reputa-
tions and when membership in the community of rule-followers (i.e.,
socialized and clean lawyers) matters. They will follow the cheater
herd in situations in which financial self-interest is particularly strong,
when the cheaters so dominate their field that rule violations are nec-
essary in order to compete, or when it is unclear that obedience to the
rules will have meaningful benefits, reputational or otherwise. Cen-
tral to the calculus is an empirical question about which theorists and
code drafters may disagree; namely, how many lawyers populate the
extreme groups? That issue is critical to whether an extreme group
(and which extreme group) has the critical mass necessary to influ-
ence the intermediate lawyers. It is also germane to whether the
group represents a sufficiently important community that the interme-
diate lawyers will want to be associated with it.
Before undertaking an analysis of past and current regulation of
lawyers, one should note that, in the lawyer context, one set of actors
who were not particularly significant in the baseball context may play
a role. There may be lawyers (some of whom fit into the clean
rational actor group) who act-or in some circumstances act-based
on their personal view of what is moral, rather than on what the rules
tell them. These lawyers engage in this type of moral discretion
encouraged by the scholarship of David Luban and others, treating
the ethics codes as informative but not dispositive.66 They sometimes
follow the rules-either because they agree with the rules or because
they understand that the rules produce good overall results that might
be undermined if individuals violate them routinely.67 But these law-
yers reserve the right to violate even good rules when they perceive
that doing so would be moral in context.
As Table 2 suggests, our model therefore should be revised to
acknowledge this additional category of actor-the "moral cheater"-
65 For a discussion of studies examining the concept of following the herd, and
their application in the context of "choice architecture," see RICHARD H. THALER &
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE 53-71 (2008).
66 See, e.g., DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, at xxii (1988) (advocating "moral
activism" by lawyers); WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OFJUSTICE 9 (1998) (urging a
"[c]ontextual [v]iew" that encourages lawyers to "take such actions as, considering
the relevant circumstances of the particular case, seem likely to promote justice").
67 Thus, for example, a lawyer in this category might conclude that violating an
attorney-client confidentiality rule in a particular case would be moral (e.g., because it
would protect the interests of a third person), but that doing so would, when the
disclosure is publicized, undermine the ability of the legal profession to achieve the
benign purpose of the confidentiality rule-namely, obtaining information from
other clients who are secure in the promise of attorney-client secrecy.
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who violates the professional rules for moral rather than economic
reasons.
TABLE 2. CATEGORY PROCLIVITY
1. Cheater Classic "bad man"
Rational, but is prone to fearing the
2. Complementary Rational Actor costs or being dubious about the
benefits of outlawed behavior
Considers the full range of costs,
3. Nuanced Rational Actor especially reputational effects of
outlawed behavior
4. Clean Rational Actor Values behaving properly and in law-
abiding fashion
5. Socialized Person Follows rules, largely unquestioningly
6. Moral Cheater Violates rules when doing so would
be moral
The new category could be placed at the top or the bottom of
Table 2, as it completes the cycle of possible human behavior. For
legal-ethics code drafters, the moral cheater presents the same prob-
lem as the bad man cheater, because professional rules that are not
strictly enforced often will have little impact on his behavior. All the
code drafters can do to encourage the moral cheater's compliance is
to write good rules that correlate to solid moral principles and are
sufficiently discretionary or nuanced to allow the moral cheater to
take moral issues into account in individual cases.
That brings us to the essential question: which category of actor
have the legal ethics codes traditionally focused upon? The 1908
Canons of Ethics,68 the first significant code,69 was a hortatory docu-
ment that primarily targeted the well-intentioned lawyer: the moral
cheater, clean rational actor, or socialized attorney. It called for ideal
behavior, such as "obey[ing one's] own conscience and not that of
[the] client,"70 selecting and managing cases so as to serve justice,71
and restraining clients' questionable conduct,72 expecting that at least
some attorneys would set aside selfish incentives to further these
68 ABA CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS (1908).
69 The honor of developing the very first legal ethics code was Alabama's, in
1887. See Carol Rice Andrews, The Lasting Legacy of the 1887 Code of Ethics of the Ala
bama State Bar Association, in CAROL RICE ANDREWS ET AL., GILDED AGE LEGAL ETHICS 7,
7-36 (2003) (discussing the Alabama code).
70 ABA CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS Canon 15 (1908).
71 Id. Canon 31.
72 Id. Canon 16.
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goals.73 The Canons were not backed by disciplinary authority,74 so
bad men and complementary rational actor lawyers had little to fear
from violations of the rules. Nuanced rational actors who especially
valued their reputations might have paid attention to those aspects of
the Canons that were universally approved or the violation of which
would secure significant public opprobrium.75 However, during
much of the period in which the Canons dominated, little agreement
about proper lawyer behavior existed,76 so a Canon alone was unlikely
to set significant reputational standards. For every Canon prescribing
aggressive lawyering there was a countervailing Canon mandating
other-regarding behavior.77
Since the late twentieth century, ethics codes have become
increasingly specific, 78 with the goal of making the codes more
enforceable.79 Disciplinary authority and resources have increased
dramatically.80 These enhancements, in effect, have targeted comple-
73 Elaborating on the events leading to the adoption of the Canons, James Alt-
man notes that the ABA committee report proposing a set of rules expected the
Canons to educate lawyers and to motivate them through "'high resolve'" and "'moral
suasion'" to "'aspire to conduct themselves in accordance with their special obliga-
tions as 'officers of the court.'" James M. Altman, Considering the A.B.A.'s 1908 Canons
ofEthics, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 2395, 2414 (2003) (quoting Report of the Comm. on Code of
Profl Ethics, 29 A.B.A. Rep. 600, 603 (1906)).
74 Proponents of the Canons, however, undoubtedly hoped that states would
adopt and implement the Canons and thus wrote some of its provisions with enforce-
ment in mind. See id. at 2491-99 (describing the drafters' expectations).
75 For example, using client funds without the client's permission (in violation of
Canon 11) or committing a crime (in violation of Canon 15). See ABA CANONS OF
PROF'L ETHICS Canons 11, 15 (1908).
76 See Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Reconceptualizing Advocacy Ethics, 74
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 3-5 (2005) (discussing the nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
tury debates over the proper roles of lawyers).
77 Compare ABA CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS Canon 15 (1908) (mandating that a
lawyer give "[his] entire devotion to the interest of the client"), with Canon 22
(imposing obligations on lawyers as officers of the court), and Canon 30 (imposing
gatekeeping obligations on lawyers), and Canon 31 (same).
78 Compare MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY (1983) (outlining vague rec-
ommendations), with MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2009) (defining more spe-
cific roles with more authoritative tone).
79 See Hazard, supra note 1, at 1249-52 (discussing the reasons for the legaliza-
tions of the codes).
80 See, e.g., Vincent R. Johnson, justice Tom C. Clark's Legacy in the Field of Legal
Ethics, 29 J. LEGAL PROF. 33, 70 (2005) (noting substantially increased funding for
disciplinary agencies since 1979); Leslie C. Levin, The Emperor's Clothes and Other Tales
About the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Discipline Sanctions, 48 Am. U. L. REV. 1, 4 (1998)
("Lawyer discipline systems are better funded . . . than they used to be." (citation
omitted)).
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mentary and nuanced rational actors by changing the calculus of
whether violations represent economically intelligent risks. Such law-
yers are most likely to respond to an increasing risk of being identified
as unprofessional and thus, punished.
Even the most specific of the modern model codes,"' however,
have not focused on cheaters or win-at-all-cost lawyers, though some of
these actors' actions are penalized through unambiguous code provi-
sions and criminal law that the regulators are willing to enforce.8 2 It is
simply too easy for cheaters to circumvent most ethics requirements;
limitations in disciplinary resources prevent the prosecution of rou-
tine violations.83 Moreover, cheaters are sensitive to the correspond-
ing benefits of breaking the rules, including rewards that particular
clients offer (such as payment for silence in the face of disclosure obli-
gations) .84 These benefits increase when few lawyers are willing to
cheat.
Thus, for example, rules explicitly forbidding solicitation,85 pro-
viding financial assistance to prospective clients,86 and sharing legal
81 E.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2009).
82 Professional rules requiring lawyers to safeguard client funds and criminal laws
against misappropriating those funds are enforced relatively strictly when instances of
misappropriation come to light. See, e.g., In re Wilson, 409 A.2d 1153, 1154-55 (N.J.
1979) (implementing a bright-line disbarment rule for misappropriation of client
funds).
83 See, e.g., STANDING COMM. ON CLIENT PROT., AM. BAR. Ass'N, 2009 SURVEY OF
UNLICENSED PRACTICE OF LAw COMMITTEES 1 (2009), available at http://
www.abanet.org/cpr/clientpro/09-upl-survey.pdf (survey finding that insufficient
funding has made enforcement of unauthorized practice of law rules difficult and
reporting six jurisdictions that conceded stated enforcement to be inactive or nonex-
istent); Lisa G. Lerman, A Double Standard for Lawyer Dishonesty: Billing Fraud Versus
Misappropriation, 34 HOFsTRA L. REv. 847, 891 (2006) ("Most bar counsel's offices
don't have enough money or staff to do more than handle what comes across the
transom [i.e., what is reported to them].").
84 See, e.g., Fred C. Zacharias, Coercing Clients: Can Lawyer Gatekeeper Rules Work?,
47 B.C. L. REV. 455, 476-78 (2006) (discussing corporate lawyers' likely responses to
clients who would not wish them to reveal information subject to a confidentiality
exception).
85 E.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3(a) (2009) ("A lawyer shall not
. . . solicit professional employment from a prospective client when a significant
motive for the lawyer's doing so is the lawyer's pecuniary gain.").
86 E.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.8(e) (2009) ("A lawyer shall not
provide financial assistance to a client in connection with pending or contemplated
litigation, except that: (1) a lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation,
the repayment of which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter . . . .");
MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-103(B) (1980) ("A lawyer shall not
advance or guarantee financial assistance to his client, except that a lawyer may
advance or guarantee the expenses of litigation . . . provided the client remains ulti-
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fees with non-lawyers87 together appear to be designed to foreclose
the use of runners and the payment of benefits to persons who bring
lawyers lucrative cases or enable lawyers to file fee-generating work.
In moral terms, these rules target relatively neutral conduct, except in
extreme cases.88 Recent events involving the Milberg Weiss law firm
have illustrated how lawyers following a pure risk-reward approach
can and do circumvent the rules.89 That does not mean, however,
that these disciplinary rules-which have rarely been enforced-are
without effect on the bar. Many lawyers take the prohibitions to heart;
they are clean rational actors and socialized lawyers who simply
assume they should follow the rules.90
mately liable for such expenses." (footnote omitted)); CAL. R. PROF. CONDUCT R. 4-
210 (1992) (forbidding a lawyer to "directly or indirectly pay or agree to pay E the
personal or business expenses of a . . . client," but allowing costs, "the repayment of
which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter").
87 E.g., MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4(a) (2009) ("A lawyer or law firm
shall not share legal fees with a non-lawyer . . . ."); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSI-
BILrTY DR 3-102 (1980) (same); CAL. R. PROF. CONDUCT 1-320 (1992) ("Neither a
member nor a law firm shall directly or indirectly share legal fees with a person who is
not a lawyer.").
88 In other words, there are good arguments that, in the ordinary situation, solic-
iting, providing money to clients, and sharing fees benefit clients and enhance the
availability of legal services. Of course, when this conduct is used as a form of duress
or to trick laypersons, the conduct can be offensive.
89 The principals of the Milberg Weiss firm, the preeminent plaintiffs' securities
class action law firm, were prosecuted and pled guilty to numerous instances involving
securing cases by sharing fees with class plaintiffs without disclosure to the court,
despite clear prohibitions in the rules against such behavior. See, e.g., Plea Agreement
for Defendant David J. Bershad at 2-3, United States v. David J. Bershad, No. CR 05-
587 (C.D. Cal. 2007); Last Defendant in Milberg Case Pleads Guilty, N.Y. TIMES, July 15,
2008, at C2.
90 An alternative theory explaining why these rules may be effective in producing
compliance is that, as a group, the rules limit competition among lawyers (i.e., in the
process of obtaining business) and therefore serve the collective long-term self-inter-
est of the bar as a whole. Cf Sean J. Griffith, Ethical Rules and Collective Action: An
Economic Analysis of Legal Ethics, 63 U. Prrr. L. REV. 347, 350 (2002) (arguing that the
current ethical regime can be viewed as method for aligning the incentives of individ-
ual lawyers with the collective interest of the profession). Complying lawyers may
deem the value of obedience (and therefore maintaining the anti-competitive collec-
tive standard) as trumping the cost of business lost to "cheaters" who obtain clients by
violating the rules.
One cannot simply conclude that any rule that serves lawyers' collective self-inter-
est can be dispensed with because lawyers will engage in (or avoid) the specified
behavior in the absence of any rule. Collective self-interest differs from individual
self-interest. Here, for example, in the absence of rules that forbid the purchasing of,
or providing inducements for, clients' causes of actions, lawyers will compete for the
business. The rules thus arguably serve the purpose of providing a standard embody-
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Indeed, many code provisions implicitly acknowledge the possi-
bility of bad men behavior and, interpreted most plausibly,9 are
designed mainly to create a culture in which winning at all costs is not
the dominant custom.9 2 By offering lawyers discretion, the codes seek
to produce a situation in which clean rational actors and socialized
lawyers can take the lead in setting the professional norms for the
bulk of the bar.9 3 This is accomplished by asserting ideals, emphasiz-
ing integrity rules that permit moral behavior, and reinforcing exter-
nal law.
Consider, for example, rules that allow but do not require lawyers
to reveal confidential information to prevent a client from commit-
ting future harms or crimes.94 The core confidentiality provisions
serve lawyers' economic interests,95 but the exceptions probably do
ing collective self-interest that makes it easier for the bulk of lawyers to engage in
parallel forbearance.
This Article agrees that code drafters might reasonably consider the possibility of
a collective self-interest in compliance when framing particular rules-both in deter-
mining whether the potentially anti-competitive effects are justifiable and in assessing
how lawyers will respond. The Article suggests, however, that the collective self-inter-
est factor is only one of several that must be taken into account in determining the
likely impact of regulation. See infra text accompanying note 153.
91 As discussed previously, this Article does not purport to know or describe the
actual intentions of the many and distinct code drafters. By using terms referring to
the apparent design of particular rules, this Article attempts to offer a plausible expla-
nation for them, which the Article then analyzes with reference to the categories of
potential targets previously described. Overall, this Article suggests that the general
approach of code drafters in employing a mixture of general and specific (or horta-
tory, enforceable, and enforced) provisions is justified, but does not attempt to sup-
port or reject the precise language of any particular rule.
92 See, e.g., John A. Bargh & Tanya L. Chartrand, The Unbearable Automaticity of
Being, 54 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 462, 462 (1999) (arguing that actors' choices are deter-
mined largely by "mental processes that are put into motion by features of the envi-
ronment and that operate outside of conscious awareness and guidance").
93 See Green & Zacharias, supra note 7, at 282-83 (discussing various possible
purposes of according lawyers discretion in the rules); Sunstein, supra note 42, at 907,
909 (arguing that "behavior is pervasively a function of norms; that norms account for
many . .. anomalies in human behavior" and that when people "appear not to maxi-
mize their 'expected utility'-it is often because of norms") (footnote omitted).
94 E.g., MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.6(b)(1) (2009) (allowing lawyers
to reveal confidential information where necessary "to prevent reasonably certain
death or substantial bodily harm"); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILIIY DR 4-
101(C) (1980) (allowing disclosure of "the intention of his client to commit a
crime").
95 By allowing lawyers to promise secrecy, confidentiality rules provide lawyers
with a competitive advantage over accountants and other service providers who can-
not do the same. See Daniel R. Fischel, Laoyers and Confidentiality, 65 U. CHI. L. REv.
1, 5-6 (1998) (arguing that confidentiality should be abolished because of its anti-
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not. The exceptions anticipate that lawyers will exercise discretion in
each covered case, based on a variety of factors, including the poten-
tial harm of disclosure or nondisclosure to the client and threatened
person, the likely effect of disclosure on attorney-client relationships
involving this and other clients, and the nature of the case.96 Under
strict economic analysis, the "bad man" lawyer would sell his right to
disclose if the client is willing to pay for it.97 The lawyer probably
could avoid anyone learning of his nondisclosure and likely would
never be disciplined for nondisclosure because of the ambiguities in
the governing disciplinary rules.98
Nevertheless, rules involving confidentiality exceptions have been
among the most fiercely debated in the code-drafting process;99 law-
yers seem to care about them a lot. That may be, in part, because
discretionary confidentiality exceptions give lawyers a competitive
advantage over other professions by allowing them to promise clients
secrecy across the board.100 Yet in practice, lawyers are sometimes
prepared to disclose, or threaten to disclose, information against their
clients' interests 01 and in accordance with the rules' hortatory pur-
poses. The explanation for this phenomenon goes beyond the exis-
competitive effects); see also Louis Kaplow & Stephen Shavell, Legal Advice About Infor-
mation to Present in Litigation: Its Effects and Social Desirability, 102 HARv. L. REv. 565, 599
(1989) (arguing that confidentiality is in the legal profession's interest); cf Stephen
Lubet & Cathryn Stewart, A "Public Assets" Theory of Lawyers'Pro Bono Obligations, 145
U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1246 (1997) (arguing that the ability to promise clients confiden-
tiality is a valuable "commodity" which society gives lawyers in exchange for the right
to impose certain social obligations on lawyers).
96 See Zacharias, supra note 62, at 370-71 (discussing drafter expectations regard-
ing confidentiality exceptions).
97 See Kraakman, supra note 55, at 70 (positing that wrongdoers and gatekeepers
would proceed with misconduct whenever its payoff exceeded their pooled penalties);
David McGowan, Why Not Try The Carrot? A Modest Proposal to Grant Immunity to Lawyers
Who Disclose Client Financial Misconduct, 92 CAL. L. REv. 1825, 1827-28 (2004) (assum-
ing that lawyers implement confidentiality exceptions based on personal economic
incentives); Zacharias, supra note 84, at 478-480 (suggesting situations in which orga-
nizational lawyers will sell or signal their willingness not to implement confidentiality
exceptions); cf Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 95, at 611 n.120 (assuming that lawyers
respond to disclosure rules based exclusively on self-interest factors).
98 Confidentiality exceptions under most ethics codes are framed in discretionary
terms, making it difficult for disciplinary authorities to claim a violation as a result of
nondisclosure. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucr R. 1.6 (2009).
99 See Ted Schneyer, Professionalism as Bar Politics: The Making of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, 14 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 677, 703-23 (1989) (describing the
intense lobbying concerning the confidentiality provisions in the 1983 Model Rules),
100 See supra note 95.
101 See Zacharias, supra note 62, at 391-94 (discussing an empirical study showing
some lawyers' willingness to disclose information to prevent future harms).
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tence of socialized lawyers who follow the rules, because the
exceptions do not explicitly require disclosures. The driving forces
must be the nuanced and clean rational actors, who value conduct
that will be approved by the outside world-either for marketing or
reputational purposes or because of a desire for respectability. 10 2
Some socialized lawyers also may implement the confidentiality excep-
tions because they interpret the provisions according to their underly-
ing spirit or because they look more broadly to the external or moral
standards that the discretion in the disciplinary provisions allow (or
encourage) them to honor. 03
In short, drafters of the confidentiality exceptions undoubtedly
understand that cheaters and complementary rational actors will take
advantage of the exceptions' discretion. The exceptions, however, tar-
get the other categories of lawyers. Whether or not the exceptions
work as intended is subject to debate.1 04 But they clearly seem to be
designed to create a setting in which professional norms can develop
without being purely legislative in nature. 05 The automatic compli-
ance of clean actor and socialized lawyers is expected to have a
"trickle-down" effect by reinforcing a socially popular standard that all
lawyers aspiring to join the community of respected attorneys will
come to follow.
Other rules, however, apparently hope to influence complemen-
tary and nuanced rational actors by creating specific positive incen-
tives or counteracting dangerous incentives that would otherwise be
too tempting by increasing the costs associated with inappropriate
behavior. Many of the lawyers in the intermediate categories, like
marginal baseball players without many endorsements or outside
102 Behavioral economists might explain this conduct as acting in accordance with
"bounded self-interest"-the notion that even rational actors "care, or act as if they
care, about others, even strangers, in some circumstances." Jolls et al., supra note 9, at
1479; cf Posner, supra note 9, at 1557 (acknowledging and explaining altruism as "a
form of rational self-interest").
103 See BEHAVIORAL LAw & ECONOMICS, supra note 37, at 8 (arguing that traditional
law and economics undervalues the fact that people sometimes "want to be treated
fairly and to act fairly"); Zacharias, supra note 62, at 403-07 (discussing the possible
purposes of according lawyers discretion in the rules).
104 See McGowan, supra note 97, at 1853-54 (arguing that more of a "stick" is
required if confidential exceptions are to be effective in encouraging disclosures).
105 See Zacharias, supra note 2, at 231-38 (explaining the legislative purposes of
codes as setting out clear, enforceable standards that will constrain lawyers' behavior);
see also Ellickson, supra note 11, at 43-44 ("[M]ost law and economics scholars have
tended to underestimate [the] importance" of "informal third-party rewards and pun-
ishments."); cf Green & Zacharias, supra note 7, at 276-86 (noting alternative expla-
nations for permissive confidentiality exceptions).
2010] 695
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
income, are dependent on continuing in the game, which makes
them prone to changes in the risk of punishment.106 Their reputa-
tions can be important for attracting clients (though there is some
question about when reputations for professional behavior will help
business' 0 7). They certainly value the maintenance of their licenses.
The greater the possibility of enforcement of particular disciplinary
rules, the likelier these lawyers are to comply. 08
The best examples of this phenomenon are rules governing law-
yer trust accounts. In the absence of strict, enforced provisions gov-
erning the commingling, accounting for, and use of funds held on
behalf of clients, lawyers would still be constrained by agency princi-
ples and fiduciary requirements. Yet there would be opportunities to
interpret the legal obligations loosely, in ways that might benefit law-
yers without subjecting them to discipline. 09 Here, the code drafters
ostensibly have made the judgment that the danger of abuse by cheat-
ers, complementary, and nuanced rational actors and the risk of mis-
understanding by all, even socialized lawyers, is too great. Setting
clear trust account rules informs the bar of the nature of each lawyer's
obligations. Enforcing the rules strictly controls the actions of most of
the complementary and nuanced rational actors, who cannot risk a
reputation for misappropriating client funds. The cheaters might be
constrained, but again only if the rewards of misappropriation do not
justify the abuse in any given case; the cheaters simply are not the
targets of the rules.
Understanding the targets of particular ethics rules helps explain,
orjustify 0 the ABA tradition of employing a mixture of provisions in
106 Psychologists like Tversky and Kanhneman established long ago that a "fram-
ing" principle exists: as a behavioral matter, persons are likely to fear a loss of an
existing benefit more than they value an equivalent foregone gain. Amos Tversky &
Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. Bus. S251,
S257-62 (1986); see also Kraakman, supra note 55, at 70 (noting that lawyers "make
attractive legal gatekeepers in part because they have large and vulnerable invest-
ments in licenses and reputations; they stand to lose too much if their corruption is
detected").
107 See Fred C. Zacharias, Effects of Reputation on the Legal Profession, 65 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 173, 179 (2008) (discussing situations in which lawyers may benefit from a
reputation for rule-violating behavior).
108 Cf Cohen, supra note 13, at 291 ("[L]egal [ethics] regulation may enhance
reputational effects by publicizing misconduct and providing more accurate informa-
tion about it than would otherwise exist.").
109 For example, lawyers might feel justified in putting funds into their own inter-
est-bearing office accounts with appropriate accounting records and keeping the
interest.
110 See supra text accompanying note 20.
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its model codes, few of which are so clear and routinely enforced that
they capture bad man lawyers' activities. There are costs to drafting a
highly specific code. Over-specificity tends to limit the scope of code
provisions, minimize the importance of introspection by lawyers, and
result in a race to the bottom in identifying standards to which every-
one can agree."' If clean rational actors and socialized lawyers exist
and will follow hortatory rules, then culture-setting code-drafting
sometimes makes sense. The rules may encourage lawyers to think in
terms of principles (e.g., loyalty) rather than legal requirementsI"2
and can help establish baselines for lawyers' reputations-which in
turn will affect, if not determine, the conduct of nuanced rational
actors. The law and economics contention that hortatory rules are
uniformly valueless therefore is misguided.
At the same time, the recognition that not all lawyers are clean
rational actors or socialized also justifies a law-and-economics focus on
the real incentives created by the rules. The existence of many com-
plementary and nuanced rational actors means that complete reliance
on Canon-like ideals will affect only a limited segment of the bar. The
intermediate lawyers may internalize the broad principles taught by
the codes, such as lawyers' fiduciary duty and obligations of candor to
the courts. But these lawyers' willingness to adjust behavior based on
the enforceability and enforcement of the rules and the nature of
average practice (which affect how rule violations impact reputations
and client-gathering) means that a threat of enforcement at least
sometimes needs to be present if the codes are to influence the bar.
Which leads to an essential question: why not simply take a bludg-
eon-like approach to ethics violations which would encompass all
potential targets, as in the current steroids situation in baseball? For
example, ban violations, test for steroids, and enforce the rules against
violators? Some of the reasons already have been mentioned. First,
investigating (i.e., proactively looking for) and prosecuting all viola-
tions would be overly resource-intensive. Second, the codes are
designed in part to produce morally diligent lawyers, not automatons
who follow only specific prohibitions. But rules promoting introspec-
tion-the consideration of what behavior is morally appropriate-
tend to leave room for disagreement and therefore are difficult to
111 See Zacharias, supra note 2, at 258-64 (discussing some of the dangers of speci-
ficity in code-drafting).
112 See Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Duty to Avoid Wrongful Convictions:
A Thought Experiment in the Regulation of Prosecutors, 89 B.U. L. REv. 1, 34-39 (2009)
(discussing the ramifications of regulating prosecutorial misconduct through bright-
line rules).
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enforce. 1 3 Third, if code drafters attempt to reduce all undesirable
behavior to enforceable rules, the number of rules will increase, but at
the same time many types of inappropriate behavior currently banned
under general proscriptions (e.g., forbidding disloyalty or lack of dili-
gence) will not be expressly forbidden. That may teach lawyers the
lesson that the unproscribed conduct is legitimate.
Most important, however, is the reality that ethics codes are a sig-
nificant factor in creating professional and cultural norms for how
lawyers should behave. Here we see a striking difference in the com-
parison to baseball. The sport's general culture derives from the his-
tory of the game and media attention to athletes' behavior. Steroid
use, for example, has come under scrutiny because the improved per-
formance of players-which in some sense seems desirable 1 4-under-
mines the comparison to past athletic performance. The media has
highlighted this dichotomy for the fans. The resulting demand for
cleaner athletes has produced a set of moral or cultural standards that
organized baseball, including players, have been forced to follow at
pain of losing their fans.
There are no corresponding economic pressures on attorneys.
Indeed, the sociology of law is dramatically different. To the extent
the media and lay observers focus on the bar, lawyers are quick to
point out that obligations to clients trump any moral obligations to
engage in other-regarding behavior.115 The history of legal practice
bears out this cultural view, at least to some extent.' 1 6 Thus, in the
absence of an ethical culture developed through peer standards and
regulation, lawyers can simply hew to client demands or engage in
113 In other words, the more general or open-ended rules are, in order to cover
many situations and make lawyers think about how to implement moral or systemic
principles, the less likely they are to proscribe conduct specifically enough to satisfy
due process requirements or be susceptible to easy proof of violations.
114 Baseball fans, for example, were enamored of the increase in home runs dur-
ing the steroid era even after some fans came to believe that steroids were the cause of
the increased production of sluggers.
115 Lawyers may, for example, use the role of lawyers and strict confidentiality
rules as shields against criticism for failing to disclose information about clients that
society wishes them to reveal. See CHARLEs WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 6.1.4,
at 243-44 (1986) (discussing self-protective uses of confidentiality rules); Zacharias,
supra note 62, at 373 ("When questioned about particular decisions, lawyers can hide
behind the shield of the rules."). In some circumstances, the codes serve the very
function of reinforcing the ability of lawyers to act in ways their role demands that
would otherwise seem immoral. See Zacharias, supra note 15, at 544 ("[A]s a result of
systemic needs, the rules must inform [lawyers] of what the extraordinary behavior
should include.").
116 See, e.g., LUBAN, supra note 66, at xx ("The adversary system . .. excuses lawyers
from common moral obligations to nonclients.").
698 [VOL. 85:2
STEROIDS AND LEGAL ETHICS CODES
behavior that clients will pay for-behavior that may be socially
acceptable, but not always.
The best use of ethics codes therefore is to identify situations in
which natural incentives and external constraints (including tort, con-
tract, fiduciary, and criminal law) fail to set a baseline that encourages
lawyers to behave in the way moral citizens ordinarily would act,
understanding the constraints imposed by lawyers' functions. 117 In
these situations, professional rules can help establish socially desirable
cultural norms for the bar. General or hortatory rules should be suffi-
cient to induce compliance in the clean rational actor and socialized
communities. Whether the standards set by these lawyers' compliance
will encourage intermediate lawyers to comply as well may depend on
how many lawyers are in the complying group and the magnitude of
the immediate incentives towards noncompliance in the category of
conduct in question."" It may also depend on how morally contesta-
ble the standards are' 19 and on whether particular rules, if followed by
enough lawyers, will serve the self-interest of lawyers as a whole even
though cheaters may occasionally benefit from violations.120 Code
117 See generally Zacharias, supra note 2, at 226-36 (discussing the role of ethics
codes in reinforcing moral behavior by lawyers). When the bar's self-interest already
is consistent with the general norms, specific codification and discipline may be
unnecessary. Intermediate lawyers will follow self-interested rulesjudging that, in the
long term, compliance will benefit all lawyers more than it will cost them individually
in lost short-term opportunities. See supra note 90.
118 Ronald Gilson has analyzed rules requiring lawyers to avoid frivolous litigation
partly from the latter perspective. He assumes that some clients will want to engage in
strategic litigation and inquires whether lawyers will forgo "income-fees from pursu-
ing strategic litigation on behalf of a client-[or] virtue [through following the rules]."
Gilson, supra note 5, at 886. He concludes that, historically, lawyers engaging in a
cost-benefit analysis often have valued the "public good" over their "private interest,"
id. at 888, but that they can comfortably do so only when informational asymmetries
"limit clients' ability to prevent lawyers from acting as gatekeepers." Id. at 899. Gilson
predicts that, as client sophistication increases, lawyers' financial incentives to please
clients will become so strong that fewer lawyers will be willing to emphasize virtue. Id.
at 901.
119 The closer a professional rule is to a restatement of a universally accepted
moral principle-such as, "lawyers should not steal from clients"-the higher the
number of clean rational actors there will be (because the rule will comport with the
lawyers' internal codes of conduct) and the likelier that intermediate rational actors
will follow the lead of clean and socialized lawyers. In these situations, the reputa-
tional costs of violations are obvious and dramatic. The concept of "shame" may
become meaningful. See Sunstein, supra note 42, at 942-46 (discussing the influence
of shame). External regulation reinforcing the moral command (e.g., criminal or
fiduciary law) is also likelier to exist.
120 See supra note 90; see also Wald, supra note 4, at 1050 (discussing the "Posner-
Fischel position . . . that professional ideals are created because they serve the inter-
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drafters must consider when more precise codes and their implemen-
tation through discipline are necessary to prod the less socially con-
scious lawyers-the complimentary and nuanced rational actors-to
obey the aspired-to cultural norms. The committed bad men or
cheaters, for the most part, are beyond the reach of ethics codes; the
codes apply to them, but only as a mechanism to sanction or de-
license them in the event their abuses come to light.121
III. RAmIFICATIONS OF TARGETING IN ETHICS CODE-DRAFTING
The analysis above suggests that there are benefits inherent in
employing a mix of generalized and specific rules in legal ethics
codes. That is not because law and economic theory is wrong, but
rather because, in applying it, economists tend to undervalue the cul-
ture-based, psychological effects that make many lawyers "good" or
rule abiding, even in the absence of stringent disciplinary enforce-
ment of the rules.122 The developing field of behavioral law and eco-
ests of the bar and that ideals serve no additional purpose except for the self-interest
of the bar"). It is important to note that the fact that an idealistic rule benefits the
bar-for example by helping it exact noncompetitive rents-does not always mean
the rule is illegitimate or bad. It may also provide social benefits, for example by
enhancing the quality of representation or helping lawyers dissuade or prevent
socially undesirable client conduct. See R.C.O. Matthews, The Economics of Professional
Ethics: Should the Professions be More Like Business?, 101 ECON. J. .737, 743-46 (1991)
(discussing potentially justifiable professional regulation that has anticompetitive
effects); cf POSNER, supra note 4, at 198 ("Glendon is correct that increased competi-
tion . . . makes it less likely that a lawyer will subordinate his client's interests to the
lawyer's conception of 'higher' social interests; but it also makes it less likely that the
lawyer will subordinate his client's interests to his own selfish interests." (citing MARY
ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS 79-91 (1994))).
121 See Fred C. Zacharias, The Purposes of Lawyer Discipline, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV.
675, 685-86 (2004) (discussing the administrative licensing function of attorney
discipline).
122 See Jolls et al., supra note 9, at 1479 ("Self-interest is bounded in a much
broader range of settings than conventional economics assumes . . . ."); cf Rostain,
supra note 3, at 1302 (noting that law and economics-oriented "regulatory legal ethics
. . . excludes from consideration lawyers who have internalized legal or moral
norms-individuals who, for example, follow rules not because of their desire to
avoid sanctions but because they are principally committed to obeying the law").
One excellent exception is Donald Langevoort's and Robert Rasmussen's analysis
of whether lawyers overstate legal risks because of their own interests, which would
violate rules against incompetence, communication, and conflicts of interest.
Langevoort and Rassmussen first analyze the issues in pure law and economics terms,
concluding that "asymmetric information allows the lawyer to charge more [by over-
stating the risks] than she would in a market with complete information" and that the
agency costs differ with respect to various payment arrangements. Donald C.
Langevoort & Robert K. Rasmussen, Skewing the Results: The Role of Lauyers in Transmit-
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nomics 2 3 is beginning to focus scholars on the psychological reasons
why targets of regulation act, but behavioral economic analysis has yet
to be applied systematically to the personal conduct of lawyers.12 4
Some inducements to improper lawyer behavior-like the added
speed and power steroids offered baseball players-may be so power-
ful that they can change the fundamentals of the game, including law-
yers' willingness to abide by professional rules.12 5 When ethics code
drafters identify such inducements, there is particular reason for them
to employ a stringent penalty and enforcement scheme. This will be
truest in situations in which lawyers routinely have incentives to violate
fiduciary obligations, practitioners can justify to themselves that their
conduct would be moral, and vague rules are subject to misunder-
standing or misinterpretation.
The classic example is conflict of interest rules. Lawyers have
financial incentives to accept cases despite a conflict of interest in vir-
tually every instance in which a conflict presents itself. In all but the
most egregious conflict situations, 1 26 lawyers can convince themselves
that they can represent multiple clients competently, on the theory
that they are able to manage psychological pressures through the
exercise of professional detachment.127 And when conflict rules
ting Legal Rules, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISc. L.J. 375, 381-82 (1997). They then go further,
however, to analyze psychological and sociological reasons why lawyers might over-
state risk without being selfishly motivated. See id. at 413-36. Langevoort's and Ras-
mussen's behavioral analysis reinforces the conclusions based on the law and
economics approach, leading them to suggest that lawyers and regulators should
focus more on the economic, social, and psychological influences on lawyers in assess-
ing and addressing their behavior. Id. at 439-40.
123 Cf Jolls et al., supra note 9, at 1476 (defining the "task of behavioral law and
economics" as "explor[ing] the implications of actual (not hypothesized) human
behavior for the law," and asking "[h]ow do 'real people' differ from homo
economicus?"). See generally BEHAVIORAL LAw & ECONOMICS, supra note 37 (collecting
some of the core findings of behavioral economics).
124 But see Leonard E. Gross, Are Differences Among the Attorney Conflict of Interest
Rules Consistent with Principles of Behavioral Economics?, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 111,
115-21 (2006) (considering whether lawyers implementing conflict of interest rules
act in accordance with economics principles).
125 This is especially true because "human beings often take actions that they know
to be in conflict with their own long-term interests." Jolls et al., supra note 9, at 1479.
Thus, even rational actors may give in, emotionally, to powerful immediate incentives
even though their choice is, for reputational or other reasons, not wise in the long
term.
126 The egregious conflict cases are discussed infra text accompanying note 129.
127 See Gross, supra note 124, at 113 ("[S]ocial science literature suggests that a
lawyer will rationalize his behavior as being ethical because of the innate human ten-
dency to rationalize one's self-interest as being consistent with morality."); cf Daicoff,
supra note 62, at 241 (suggesting that lawyers may evaluate questionable ethical
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accord lawyers discretion, lawyers may assume that the drafters are
leaving to them the entire decision of whether they should take the
case. 128 Under these circumstances, it would be foolhardy for ethics
code drafters to rely on hortatory or open-textured rules, because all
lawyers-from cheaters to clean rational actors and socialized law-
yers-would be drawn to dangerous conduct and would not be held
back by countervailing influences.
The existing conflict rules acknowledge this reality in part, by
providing a laundry list of specific potential conflicts of interest that
provisions like Model Rule 1.8 forbid lawyers to undertake. 129 In
other respects, however, the drafters of conflict regulation ill-advisedly
provide high-minded rules addressed primarily to clean and socialized
lawyers-rules that intermediate lawyers can abuse. The basic conflict
provision, Model Rule 1.7, allows lawyers to seek client consent to
most conflicts and predicates the operation of the rule to cases involv-
ing a "significant risk" of impacted representation. 130 The rule also
does not signal any independent obligation of the lawyer to avoid
seeking consent when a waiver would be unwise for the client.1 3'
Because the rule's ambiguity reduces the adverse reputational effects
of violations, the result is not surprising: intermediate lawyers fre-
quently interpret conflict rules in a way that favors their economic
interests. Satellite litigation regarding the substantiality of conflicts
has become routine.
There is a separate aspect of the basic conflict of interest provi-
sion that has never been adequately considered. Some potential con-
flicts are so obvious or egregious that virtually all lawyers (except
perhaps the first category of bad man lawyers) would agree that
accepting the representation would be immoral and improper; for
example, representation of adverse clients with confidential informa-
tion relevant to the other's case. In cases involving such conflicts, the
behavior more flexibly when it involves their own, rather than another person's
behavior).
128 Cf Fred C. Zacharias, Waiving Conflicts of Interest, 108 YALE L.J. 407, 432-33
(1998) (arguing that lawyers have an obligation not to accept some cases in which
representation seems to be allowed under the conflict rules).
129 Leonard Gross has suggested that the "disparate treatment [in these rules]
stems in part from the Model Rules' drafters' perception that some conflicts are more
likely to cause a lawyer to take advantage of a client than others." Gross, supra note
124, at 112.
130 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucr R. 1.7 (2009).
131 See Fred C. Zacharias, The Preemployment Ethical Role of Lawyers: Are Lauyers Really
Fiduciaries?, 49 WM. & MARY L. REv. 569, 580-82 (2008) (discussing the potential fidu-
ciary obligation of lawyers to seek consent from prospective clients only when that
would be in the clients' best interests).
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number of attorneys willing to follow the rule will be significant. One
theory explaining this phenomenon may be that the category of clean
actors has expanded for this sphere of conduct. Another plausible
account is that, because the moral implications are so clear, the
reputational impact of violations increases. Whatever the explana-
tion, for these types of conflicts, external constraints-including
agency and fiduciary law-reinforce the inclination of lawyers to obey
the rules' letter and spirit.
When consensus moral principles and other law (e.g., enforced
criminal or agency law), external regulation, or the market already
impose constraints on lawyer behavior, the need for strict professional
regulation and enforcement is diminished. Indeed, when external
constraints are fully effective,132 it makes sense to dispense with disci-
plinary rules altogether.133 A rule forbidding lawyers to engage in
criminal conduct,13 4 for instance, arguably adds nothing.
Yet even where external constraints exist, hortatory or genera-
lized rules may sometimes make sense as a means for developing a
culture of introspection and generally moral behavior' 35 or as a
means of clarifying for lawyers (or reminding them) that their client-
132 One can dispute what "fully effective" means. For example, a disciplinary rule
punishing a lawyer for being convicted of a crime is necessarily duplicative but may
provide supplemental deterrence. It also makes it easier for the bar to exercise its
licensing function through suspensions or disbarment. Whether such a rule is neces-
sary or appropriate depends largely on what one believes are the purposes of disci-
pline. See Zacharias, supra note 121, at 696-98 (discussing the issue of whether
lawyers should be subject to professional discipline for conduct that does not suggest
an inability to represent clients well).
133 The existence of such rules may have costs in diverting enforcement resources
toward conduct already adequately deterred, disappointing lay observers when viola-
tions are not duplicatively punished through discipline, and giving rise to theoretical
arguments that the rules somehow change, or weaken, the applicability of the exter-
nal constraints on lawyers.
134 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(b) (2009). But see Zacharias,
supra note 121, at 687.
135 An interesting example is the professional mandate that prosecutors "serve jus-
tice." See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2009) ("A prosecutor
has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate.");
MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1980) (requiring government law-
yers "seek justice"). There is a serious question of whether this general mandate
makes sense as written. See, e.g., Zacharias, supra note 2, at 248 (discussing the likely
effects of the justice requirement). On the best view, however, it encourages prosecu-
tors to consider their ethical obligations more broadly than limited explicit prohibi-
tions on particular conduct. Cf Zacharias & Green, supra note 112, at 13 (noting that
disciplinary agencies have failed to use the justice requirement "with an eye toward
developing prosecutorial standards").
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oriented role does not obviate moral behavior.'3 6 For example, no
lawyer would deny that one who assists his client in committing a
crime is punishable as an aider and abettor or co-conspirator. A pro-
fessional rule that forbids assisting illegal conduct, however-even if
never enforced because criminal law does the heavy lifting-may serve
to remind lawyers that their client-oriented role does not relieve them
of the ordinary obligation of law compliance. To the extent code
drafters wish to exert influence specifically on intermediate categories
of lawyers who are tempted to overemphasize role-differentiation,
occasional random enforcement of the professional rule can be as
effective as a strict disciplinary regime.
Of course, there is a range of lawyer-practices about which lawyers
do disagree substantively; here, the issue is not lawyers' willingness to
abide by the codes, but rather a debate about whether the activity is
proper. For the most part, clarity in the rules rather than heavy
enforcement is needed to resolve such issues-as in the case of rules
against lawyers' acquisition of media13 7 and other pecuniary interests
in their clients' cases13 8 or rules forbidding engaging in sexual rela-
tionships with clients,'39 all of which lawyers might reasonably justify
to themselves as legitimate behavior. 140 Again, a random enforce-
ment policy can reinforce the regulators' intentions, but even that
might not be necessary; only the "bad man" lawyer and "moral
cheater" are likely to violate an unambiguous, clarifying rule involving
these matters. 1 4
This Article's analysis concedes a sad fact. Few ethics rules will
work to constrain the worst type of potential offenders-the cheaters
or complementary rational actors who have strong financial incentives
to commit violations. Moral cheaters also are largely beyond the influ-
136 See Zacharias, supra note 2, at 227-33 (discussing ways in which code provisions
can counteract false assumptions, or misguided natural tendencies, that become
engrained in lawyers when they internalize their general role).
137 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr R. 1.8(d) (2009) ("[A] lawyer shall
not make or negotiate an agreement giving the lawyer literary or media rights to a
portrayal or account based in substantial part on information relating to the
representation.").
138 See, e.g., id. R. 1.8(i) ("A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the
cause of action or subject matter of litigation . . . .").
139 See, e.g., id. R. 1.8(j) ("A lawyer shall not have sexual relations with a client
unless a consensual sexual relationship existed between them when the client-lawyer
relationship commenced.").
140 See supra text accompanying notes 85-87.
141 In effect, the informative bright-line rule serves to reduce the costs of decision
making on a case-by-case basis by individual lawyers. See McClennen, supra note 18, at
231 (discussing "rule[s] of nondeliberation").
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ence of the regulators. Yet hortatory rules and standards can affect
some lawyers. And to the extent a culture of professional behavior
flourishes among clean rational actors and socialized lawyers, the
adverse reputational effect of rule violations becomes more signifi-
cant. In the long run, this may positively influence the conduct of
complementary and nuanced rational actors. 142
Nevertheless, in selecting among code-drafting options, it is
important to recognize that there can be a synergistic effect in the
behavior of the different categories of actors. Just as rule compliance
by clean actors and socialized lawyers can have a cultural effect on
intermediate lawyers, so also can the behavior of cheaters. 143 As in the
example of the baseball athletes, if a large number of lawyers cheat
because doing so generates better contracts or fees, the incentives
increase for other lawyers to violate the rules in order to compete. 144
Likewise, if a few cheaters dominate a particular field of practice-as,
for example, the Milberg Weiss firm was able to dominate plaintiffs'
securities class actions-other lawyers in the field may increasingly
feel the need to level the playing field.145
Code drafters therefore cannot focus exclusively on the presence
of clean rational actors and socialized lawyers and simply hope their
compliance will generate a professional cultural climate across the
board. 146 The drafters must realistically assess how the bar is divided
in the contexts governed by particular rules and must evaluate the
142 See Rostain, supra note 3, at 1303 ("[T]he success of a regulatory project
depends on ... an infrastructure of shared commitments to law and legal institutions
among lawyers and regulators . . . [including] social norms.").
143 Cf id. at 1321 ("[S]ocial norms are just as likely to undercut as to reinforce
legal norms.").
144 See Gregory S. Kavka, The Toxin Puzzle, 43 ANALYSIS 33, 35 (1983) (analyzing
how, as a moral matter, a commitment to pursue (or avoid) particular conduct is
affected by the relationship between intention and reason); see also Reed Elizabeth
Loder, Tighter Rules of Professional Conduct: Saltwater for Thirst?, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
311, 328 (1987) (arguing that "even lawyers who believe in the ethical superiority of a
certain course of conduct will engage in substandard behavior if they perceive other
lawyers will so behave without sanction" and that they would otherwise suffer "profes-
sional disadvantage").
145 In other words, competing lawyers feel the need to match the cheating law
firms in order to identify and enlist class plaintiffs by offering them financial incen-
tives (e.g., a share of the fees) and promising never to collect expenses from them
even though the ethics rules in some jurisdictions require clients to remain responsi-
ble for the costs of litigation. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-103(B)
(1980); supra note 86.
146 See Langevoort, supra note 55, at 1499-500 ('judges, policymakers, and aca-
demics invoke mental models of individual and social behavior whenever they esti-
mate the desirability of alternative rules, policies, or procedures . . . . [I]f these
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likely effects of any proposed reform. The more that the regulators
can anticipate that lawyers in the complementary and nuanced
rational actor categories will fear reputational effects of rule violations
and side with the clean rational actor and socialized lawyers, the more
the regulators can risk unenforced or underenforced rules.147 If the
drafters anticipate that particular provisions will operate differently
with respect to various practice areas, the drafters need to consider
adopting more specialized rules. 148
An interesting example of the synergistic effect of lawyer behavior
involves rules limiting legal advertising.14 9 For a variety of reasons,
these rules are not well enforced.15 0 As an empirical matter, cheat-
ers-particularly cheaters in the segment of the bar that represents
individual clients in criminal, personal injury, matrimonial, and bank-
ruptcy matters-have little fear of sanctions. 15 1 This has put signifi-
cant pressure on lawyers who would compete with the cheaters to
advertise improperly as well; non-enforcement both reduces the
potential costs of rule-violations for complementary and nuanced
rational actors and, by making cheating easier, emphasizes the bene-
fits of violations. Depending on how much business cheaters siphon
away, the incentives of intermediate rational actors to compete may
become greater than the impetus to preserve reputation and abide by
predictions are naive and intuitive, without any strong empirical grounding, they are
susceptible to error and ideological bias.").
147 Predicting reputational effects may require a sophisticated analysis of particu-
lar fields of practice and types of lawyers. Zacharias, supra note 107, at 181-83. The
nature of the reputations sought by lawyers, for example, may differ among lawyers
representing corporations and individuals. Id. at 190-91; see also Gilson, supra note 5,
at 901-03 (discussing corporate clients' increasing sophistication in evaluating legal
work). Some sets of potential clients may have access to lawyers' reputations in the
legal community, others may rely on manufactured reputations (such as advertised
reputations), and others may not rely on reputations at all.
148 See Fred C. Zacharias, The Future Structure and Regulation of Law Practice: Con-
fronting Lies, Fictions, and False Paradigms in Legal Ethics Regulation, 44 ARIz. L. REV. 829,
840 (2002) (discussing the "fiction" that all lawyers and clients should be governed by
the same rules); Fred C. Zacharias, Reconceptualizing Ethical Roles, 65 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 169, 207-08 (1997) (suggesting consideration of specialized codes or other law-
yer regulation).
149 Although the Model Rules now limit advertising restrictions to "false or mis-
leading" communications, see MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDuCT R. 7.1 (2009), some
states continue to regulate legal advertising as much as is constitutionally permissible.
See e.g., CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1-400 (2008); FLA. RULES OF PROF'L CON-
DUcr R. 4-7 (2008); OHIO CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILiTY DR 2-101 (2003).
150 See Zacharias, supra note 8, at 984-95 (discussing the enforcement of legal
advertising rules).
151 See id. at 1005-15 (discussing the empirical effects of underenforcement of
legal advertising rules).
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the cultural norm set by the rules and the clean rational actor and
socialized lawyers.
Regulators who continue to believe in the advertising limitations
can respond to the obvious cheating in several ways.152 They can
strengthen the prohibitions in the rules. But advertising proscriptions
already tend to be fairly clear. The regulators can enhance enforce-
ment, even if only on a selective or area-of-practice basis, both to
increase the costs of violations and to reinforce the reputational con-
sequences of cheating. They can make the judgment that the number
of cheaters is not sufficient to produce a behavioral race to the bot-
tom-for example, because the advertising prohibitions, in general,
serve the self-interest of the bar as a whole.15 3 Or they can adopt a
wait-and-see attitude, and evaluate the empirical effects of cheating
over time. Under any of these options, the drafters must at some
point make an assessment of how, given the demographics of the bar
and the power of the economic incentives specifically at issue, suggest-
ible lawyers respond to cheating, on the one hand, and rule-abiding
conduct by cleaner members of the bar, on the other.
Because incentives vary among segments of the bar and with
respect to different kinds of practice behavior, no single approach to
rulemaking can be effective. In the end, ethics codes probably need
to represent a considered mix of specific and general rules. Yet it is
important that the code drafters remain conscious of why they are
taking particular approaches to any given situation; they need to ana-
lyze the incentives on lawyers that would exist in the absence of pro-
posed rules, the existing external constraints, and the reputational
effects of conduct both in the absence of ethics proscriptions and
under different possible formulations of the rules. Both hortatory
152 See Note, supra note 51, at 2134 (noting that "rulebreaking may be an impor-
tant feature of rule design"). An alternative, of course, is for regulators simply to
recognize that regulating anything but false legal advertising is futile and to do away
with the prevailing rules. See Fred C. Zacharias, What Direction Should Legal Advertising
Regulation Take?, 2005J. PROF. LAw. 45, 66-67 (arguing against restrictive advertising
rules).
153 If followed by most lawyers, advertising limitations may reduce overall competi-
tion and all lawyers' advertising costs. Intermediate rational actor lawyers therefore
may be willing to comply even if that gives a competitive advantage to some cheaters
on the theory that, long-term, compliance will make them better off. The viability of
this approach may depend on the particular area in which a lawyer practices, because
the number of potential cheaters and the remaining business available for compliant
lawyers may vary from field to field. Hence, criminal or personal injury practitioners
may, for example, assess the benefits of compliance differently than corporate attor-
neys. This, in turn, might justify rulemakers in differentiating among fields of prac-
tice in promulgating the standards.
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and incentive-changing provisions sometimes make sense in light of
the range of lawyers the rules govern and the overall effects new rules
may have on the tenor of the codes as a whole.
CONCLUSION
Ethics regulators, including code drafters and disciplinary author-
ities, need to be more conscious of whom their regulation targets.
Often, new regulation follows or responds to media reports involving
sensational misconduct by lawyers, because such reports cause a pub-
lic furor and demand for change. For example, in the aftermath of
the Enron scandals, the bar considered new rules governing the dis-
closure of confidential information and the obligations of organiza-
tional attorneys.' 54 Media reports, however, tend to focus on the
activities of bad man lawyers, who are unlikely to be affected by any
form of new rule that is likely to be adopted.' 5 5 Given the limited
investigative and disciplinary resources available to the bar, ethics
codes are an unlikely vehicle for counteracting the behavior of cheat-
ers. In the post-Enron example, the new rules that were adopted-a
discretionary exception to confidentiality and a rule requiring organi-
zational lawyers to go up the ladder unless doing so would not be in
their clients' interests-would not have changed the conduct of the
Enron lawyers one whit had they been in force.' 5 6
This Article has suggested that, in fact, ethics provisions fruitfully
can, and frequently do, target categories of lawyers other than the
154 For a full discussion of the ABA proposals, see Susan P. Koniak, When the Hurly-
burly's Done: The Bar's Struggle with the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1236, 1254-56,
1263-64 (2003). See also Roger C. Cramton, Enron and the Corporate Lawyer: A Primer on
the Legal and Ethical Issues, 58 Bus. L.J. 143, 173-76, 180-82 (2002) (explaining the
systemic nature of misconduct and reporting problems post-Enron and recom-
mending that state courts implement ABA proposals).
155 In other words, bad-man lawyers will engage in lucrative improper conduct
unless the chances of being detected and punished exceed the likely gains.
156 See Koniak, supra note 154, at 1247 ("The ethics rules prohibit 'knowing' assis-
tance of illegality. Can lawyers ever 'know' that x behavior will violate the law?");
Developments in the Law: Corporations and Society, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2227, 2246 (2004)
(arguing that, because the post-Enron SEC and ABA rules are permissive, "lawyers will
have few incentives to exercise their reporting right; indeed, lawyers will have strong
economic incentives to please the managers of their current or potential clients by
refraining from reporting, even if their inaction allows questionable activity to go
unchecked"); cf Raxak Mahat, A Carrot for the Lawyer: Providing Economic Incentives For
In-House Lawyers In a Sarbanes-Oxey Regime, 21 GEO. J. LEcAL ETIcs 913, 922-25
(2008) (arguing that the Sarbanes-Oxley regulations do not provide in-house corpo-
rate lawyers with sufficient incentives to carry out their ethical duties); Regan, supra
note 48, at 941-42 (noting the predominant importance of organizational culture in
determining the behavior of lawyers with the organization).
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"bad men." Rules sometimes are explicitly premised on high-minded
claims by drafters-for example, that attorneys naturally will act loy-
ally to their clients and that specific prohibitions against disloyal acts
therefore are unnecessary. These idealistic sentiments actually make
sense when the rules in question target categories of well-intentioned
lawyers or those with preexisting (e.g., client-driven) incentives that
are consistent with loyalty. But such targeting is justified only if the
code drafters have made a conscious assessment that well-intentioned
lawyers are sufficiently numerous or influential that their behavior will
set a cultural norm that rational actors who are not strictly "bad men"
will follow. Code drafters should be more careful than they have been
in the past to identify their empirical or calculated assumptions about
who intermediate lawyers are most likely to emulate (i.e., cheaters or
socialized lawyers).157
As in the baseball context, one cannot overemphasize the impor-
tance of the empirical calculations. A well-intentioned but unen-
forced or underenforced regulatory policy that leaves most of the
rewards in the hands of cheaters can be worse than no policy at all; it
may drive intermediate actors into the cheating camp while creating
the impression that the issues are being addressed. On the other
hand, avoiding regulation because a few bad men might benefit from
it can be equally short sighted. There is no easy answer to the ques-
tion of when informal, hortatory, or underenforced rules will have
their desired effect. In theory, there may be a tipping point-or "opti-
mal level of deviation just below the threshold at which collective
harm begins to set in"1 8-but rulemakers cannot hope to identify
that tipping point accurately in every case. They can only be aware of
the countervailing considerations and recognize the significance of
the behavioral and numerical issues.
Identifying the targets of regulation can help determine how eco-
nomic incentives, and which incentives, need to be changed with
respect to particular provisions. A direct focus on intermediate law-
yers-the risk-averse complementary rational actors and nuanced
157 One could recharacterize the questions this Article addresses as: What is
rational behavior? Do lawyers really act as self-interested rational actors? When is it
appropriate to allow individual lawyers not to follow the rules? However one frames
the issues, the bottom line is the same. One should not deem rules automatically
invalid simply because they do not have full coercive force. This conclusion leaves a
horrific empirical question open for rulemakers; namely, how to evaluate the likely
effects of hortatory or unenforced rules and, therefore, when to use such rules. But
without a realistic view that this is the key question that needs deciding, the
rulemakers have no hope of producing meaningful professional rules.
158 Goldman, supra note 49, at 455.
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rational actors-may prompt a particular rule formulation. That
approach sometimes will suggest the need for wording that can
change the risk assessment of calculating lawyers. More often, how-
ever, it will suggest something about enforcement of the principles
underlying a rule, which in turn will give rise to a different kind of
language that the rule should include.
Unfortunately, code drafters historically have divorced the sub-
stance of the rules from enforcement considerations in their thinking.
When they have considered enforcement at all, they have limited
themselves to determining how specific rules should be. In fact, there
are many ways in which language in the rules can enhance enforce-
ment possibilities. The rules can express the code drafters' intentions
about how the rules are to be interpreted, particularly when they
encompass lawyer discretion. 59 The codes can include requirements
that facilitate evidence gathering'60 or proof of violations.16 1 Com-
ments can identify and clarify what behavior is inappropriate.
What makes the code-drafting enterprise complicated is the exis-
tence not only of various categories of lawyers, but also the fact that
lawyers within categories may respond in varying ways to rules (and
enforcement of rules) governing different contexts. The analogy to
baseball is again apt. Some players and managers work their way into
baseball lore by finding ways to take full benefit of favorable rules' 62
and by cheating on a day-to-day basis.163 Yet Tony LaRussa, the cur-
159 See Green & Zacharias, supra note 7, at 312 (analyzing the difficulty in identify-
ing the code-drafting intentions underlying discretionary rules).
160 See, e.g., Fred C. Zacharias, Reconciling Professionalism and Client Interests, 36 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1303, 1366-73 (1995) (arguing that including a professional require-
ment that lawyers memorialize conversations with their clients about ethical limita-
tions on partisanship would facilitate proof of how lawyers actually behaved).
161 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr R. 1.7(b) (4) (2009) (requiring that
lawyers provide information and obtain consents to conflicts of interest in writing).
162 Perhaps no modem manager has been more willing to use the rules to his
advantage than Billy Martin. See Derek Zumsteg, Billy Martin: A Cheater's Cheater,
ESPN.com, Aug. 13, 2007, http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/cheat/news/story?id=
2967031 (describing Billy Martin's manipulation of the rules and willingness to violate
them); see also Rick Weinberg, Moment 67: Pine Tar Nullifies Home Run So Brett Goes
Ballistic, ESPN.com, http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/espn25/story?page=moments/
67 (last visited Dec. 10, 2009) (describing Martin's nullification of a winning home
run by George Brett on the basis of a violation of an obscure rule that limited pine tar
on bats to eighteen inches from the bottom).
163 Perhaps the best example of cheating behavior is that of the 1890s Baltimore
Orioles, who used to hide a baseball in the long grass and, when a ball in play rolled
past a player in a poorly lit stadium, would use the hidden substitute to throw or tag
out a runner. See DAVID NEMEC, THE OFFIciAL RuLES OF BASEBALL ILLUSTRATED 104
(2006) (describing the practices of the Baltimore Oriole outfielders); Am. Cultural
[VOL. 85-2710
STEROIDS AND LEGAL ETHICS CODES
rent manager of the St. Louis Cardinals, received equally favorable
attention for acting as a clean rational actor by not taking advantage
of a rule that should have caused the ejection of the opposing pitcher
in a key game. LaRussa believed that such action would not have been
in the spirit or tradition of the World Series. 16 4 Likewise, throughout
the history of baseball, players have been glorified for aggressive (and
theoretically illegal) play that, viewed realistically, has placed other
players in danger-for example Ty Cobb's slides with spikes high165
and Bob Gibson's pitches at an opposing batter's head' 66-while
other players are more socially minded about risking other players'
health.
The regulators of lawyers must deal with a parallel situation in
which they must predict how lawyers will receive and respond to regu-
latory mandates in a variety of situations, without assuming that all
attorneys act in the "bad man" mold. As Donald Langevoort has writ-
ten, "Nearly all interesting legal issues require accurate predictions
about human behavior to be resolved satisfactorily." 6 7 Context, law-
yers' personalities, and fields of practice all affect the calculus, in addi-
tion to economic incentives. This reality calls for flexibility in
professional rulemaking. It also helps explain the mixed nature of
the prevailing ethics codes.
Studies Program, Bowling Green State Univ., The Baltimore Orioles, http://
www.bgsu.edu/departments/acs/1890s/baseball/orioles.html (last visited Dec. 8,
2008) ("The Baltimore Orioles would do anything to win whether or not it was
legal."); see also Baseball-Bats.net, Baseball Bat Memories, http://www.baseball-
bats.net/baseball-bats/baseball-bat-memories/index.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2009)
(describing Albert Belle's use of an illegally corked bat and his team's attempt to steal
the bat from the umpires' locker room before it could be tested).
164 Suspecting that opposing pitcher Kenny Rogers had a banned substance, such
as pine tar, on his hand, Tony LaRussa requested between innings that he wash his
hands rather then having his hands inspected during play, which would have resulted
in Rogers' ejection and likely suspension. Ethics Scoreboard, Tony Larussa's World
Series Ethics, Oct. 26, 2006, http://www.ethicsscoreboard.com/list/larussa.html.
165 See, e.g., DAN HOLMES, TY COBB, at xxi, 126 (2004) (describing Ty Cobb's will-
ingness to deliberately collide with or spike fielders in order to dislodge a baseball).
166 See Jonah Keri, Forty Years Later, Gibson's 1.12 ERA Remains Magic Number,
ESPN.com, Feb. 7, 2008, http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/blackhistory2008/col-
umns/story?page=keri/080221 ("[D]ig into the box against Gibson, and he'd stuff a
fastball in your ear.").
167 Langevoort, supra note 55, at 1499.
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